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ABSTRACT

By law, the British government seals all cabinet and other important government
documents until after thirty years passes. In 2012, the “thirty-year rule” expired for all
documents pertaining to the Falklands War of 1982. There is already an enormous
amount of material written about the war but these released documents provide new
insight. Lasting only one hundred days, the war was kicked off when Argentina invaded
the Falkland Islands, or known in Argentina as las Malvinas, on 2 April 1982. Located in
the very South Atlantic and four hundred miles east of Argentina, the British launched
their largest naval task force since World War II to recover their colony. By 14 June
1982, the islands were back in British possession. Relying heavily on these new
documents, this thesis analyzes the controversial sinking of the ARA General Belgrano.
This examination demonstrates the British fear of the Argentine navy and the potentially
catastrophic damage it could have inflicted on not only the two British carriers, the HMS
Hermes and HMS Invincible, but also on the overall British campaign. The documents
also highlight the British government’s efforts to control the media, albeit not all efforts
were successful. This section relies heavily on the government documents but also
journalistic accounts, British commander biographies, and newspapers written during the
war and years later. Allowing the government documents to speak for themselves, this
thesis will expand the historiography of the Falklands War of 1982.
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CHAPTER I
PROLOGUE
This is the story of a freak of history, almost certainly the last colonial war that Britain
will ever fight. So extraordinary an event was it that, even after men began to die, many
of those taking part felt as if they had been swept away into fantasy, that the ships sinking
and the guns firing round them had somehow escaped from a television screen in the
living room.1
- Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins
Major-General Jeremy Moore of the Royal Marines woke up to a disturbing
telephone call at 03:00 on 2 April 1982. The caller informed his staffer that the
Argentines were in the midst of invading the Falkland Islands. In total disbelief, Moore
demanded to be assured that this call was not a belated April Fool’s joke.2 By the time he
reached his headquarters, the British government had already determined to deploy a task
force to be sent to the South Atlantic. The Argentine invasion of the British colony
triggered the largest British naval response since the Second World War. Located 400
miles east of the coast of Argentina in the very south of the Atlantic, the Falkland Islands
are essentially rock covered in moss and sheep, and dominated by the cold Antarctic
weather. They hold no real strategic or tactical advantage for either Argentina or Great
Britain. Originally a whaling station and port, the islands have been a source of political
tension between the Argentines and the British since 1765. However, the political dispute
quickly escalated on 2 January 1833 when Captain John Onslow took possession of the
islands on behalf of Britain. Argentine Captain Don Jose Maria Pinedo had already laid
claim to the islands but Onslow’s military might forced the Argentines off the islands.

1

Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (New York, W.W. Norton &
Company, 1983), vii
2
Ibid, 85

1

Thereafter, the British claimed sovereignty and placed the islands under British control;
they were subsequently settled by Britons. However, this situation was never accepted by
Argentina. The sovereignty dispute was brought to the United Nations after the Second
World War and there were numerous, albeit failed, diplomatic attempts for a peaceful
solution in the 1970’s between the two countries.3 By this time, both countries suffered
from internal economic and political difficulties. Ironically, the Falkland Islands provided
a distraction for both British and Argentine citizens as patriotic sentiments were
heightened throughout the two countries as result of the invasion.
The islands are located 8,000 miles from Britain and it took the British Task Force
over three weeks to reach the area. Aerial combat began on 1 May and British forces
landed on East Falkland on 21 May. By 14 June 1982, the British had recaptured Port
Stanley, the capital of the Falklands. The war lasted only one hundred days but it resulted
in the deaths of 253 British men: 85 from the Royal Navy, 26 from the Royal Marines,
123 Army, 1 Royal Air Force, and 18 British civilians deployed with the Task Force.4
775 British troops were wounded, while 115 were prisoners of war (POWs). The Royal
Navy suffered heavily, losing 2 destroyers (HMS Coventry and Sheffield), 2 frigates
(HMS Ardent and Antelope), 1 landing ship logistics (Sir Galahad), 1 landing craft utility

3

For the best overview of the political negotiations and disputes leading up the 1982 invasion,
see Max Hastings, and Simon Jenkins. The Battle for the Falklands. (New York and London:
W.W. Norton and Company, 1983)
4
Sir Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. II, (London and
New York: Routledge, 2005), 772-774 and Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs
of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, (Annapolis: Bluejacket Books, 1997), 348
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(LCU F4) and 1 container ship (Atlantic Conveyor). Argentine losses included 655 dead
and a staggering 11,848 POWs.5
The historiography of the Falklands War is extensive. The political issues that have
been considered include the effects of the Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, the debates over decolonization after World War II, Argentina’s transformation into a military dictatorship in
1976, Thatcherism, American perception and involvement, the power of the United
Nations, and post-war diplomatic and political lessons. Since the Soviets and the
Americans were not directly involved, this war also prompted historians to look further
into these types of marginal conflicts. Generally, the Falklands War is seen as a Cold War
anomaly: a peripheral war involving a first world power and a third world country.
In terms of military significance, the Falklands War was the first to demonstrate the
capabilities of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN). Military historians have also focused
on the use of helicopters, the continuing advancement of field medicine and mobile
hospitals, and the unimaginable 8,000 mile logistical system. The landing of British
troops on East Falkland also prompted historians to continue examining maneuver
warfare and landing doctrine. Naval and aerial aspects of the war are given a significant
amount of attention by military historians. Debates and questions remain: did the British
achieve command of the air? Command of the sea? What is command of the air and the
sea? Does the definition change with different types of conflict? This thesis will examine
some of these questions.

5

Martin Middlebrook, Argentine Fight for the Falklands. (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military,
2009), 282-284 and Freedman, Vol. II, 658

3

While providing an outline, Chapter II traces the chronology of the war while
simultaneously examining the broader historical issues. Admittedly, this chapter does not
cover every political, diplomatic or military event; it focuses on the areas of heavy debate
surrounding the war, largely between March 1982 and June 1982. The study includes
contributing factors leading to the war including the political situations in Great Britain
and Argentina, the South Georgia Island invasion, and the failure of British intelligence
to predict the invasion. It examines the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the British
diplomatic and military response, the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano, British
command of the air and sea, and British repossession of the islands. Finally, it includes a
discussion of current debates surrounding the war and relations of the British government
and military with British and American journalists. It also includes a general analysis of
American, British and South American historiographies.
Chapter III examines the most controversial aspect of the Falklands War: the
sinking of the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano by a British SSN. The British
decision to sink the cruiser outside the established total exclusion zone (TEZ) generated
heavy criticism from international actors but also politicians and citizens within Britain.
The controversy grew into conspiracy when allegations were made in the House of
Commons that the Thatcher government, in spite of a peace deal on the table, deliberately
ordered the sinking. These allegations charged the Thatcher government with
unnecessarily escalating the war. However, recently released government documents
demonstrate the fear of the Argentine navy and the potential it had for ending the British

4

campaign to recover the islands. This chapter uses the documents, recent biographies and
other recent details to justify the British decision to sink the Belgrano.
Chapter IV also uses recently released documents to analyze the British
assessment of potential foreign assistance and potential for foreign intervention. While a
substantial amount of attention is given to the Cold War superpowers, the Americans and
the Soviets, the British also examined the majority of Latin and South American
countries and their potential for involvement. The documents also highlight the British
attempts at controlling the media throughout the campaign. Although the media
contributed to the rise in patriotism during the war, they also proved to be another thorn
in the British military’s and government’s sides. This chapter examines many situations
where British media contributed to Argentine intelligence by broadcasting sensitive
information and in some cases, blatantly reported details that jeopardized the lives of
servicemen. American newspapers are also used in the chapter; despite not being directly
involved in the war, the Americans portrayed many instances of clashing between the
British government and media.
This thesis uses the documents released following the expiration of “the thirty
year rule.” Using newspaper articles, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign,
and autobiographies to bridge any gaps in material, this thesis allows the documents to
settle questions and offer new interpretations for the Falklands War of 1982.

5

CHAPTER II
THE FALKLANDS WAR:
A TIMELINE OF MAJOR HISTORIGRAPHICAL ISSUES
When you stop a dictator there are always risks but there are great risks in not stopping
a dictator. My generation learned that a long time ago. 6
-

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

The British won't fight. 7
-

Argentine Junta Dictator General Leopoldo Galtieri

The 1970’s saw change in governments for both the Great Britain and Argentina. In
1976, Isabel Peron was deposed from the Argentine Presidency and was succeeded by a
group of military officers simply called “the Junta,” with General Jorge Rafael Videla
serving as the President.8 Videla left office in March 1981 and Army Commander-inChief General Leopoldo Galtieri rose to the Presidency in December 1981. The
Conservative Party, led by Margaret Thatcher, won the 1979 election in Britain. The
Conservatives did not view the South Atlantic as the main defense concern for their
country; that continued to be the Soviet threat to Western Europe.9 By 1982, only 1,813

6

Glyn Mathais. Interview with Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher: Interview for ITN on the Falklands.
ITN, 5 April 1982
7
General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri responding to a warning from US Secretary of State
Alexander Haig about the consequences of the invasion. 10 April 1982. Quoted in Alexander
Haig, Caveat (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 280 as cited in Keith B. Payne, The Fallacies of
Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction (Louisville: University of Kentucky Press, 2001), 57
8
Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice, The Sinking of the Belgrano (London: Secker & Warburg,
1984), 15
9
Michael D. Kandiah, “Elite Oral History and the Global Implications Of the Falklands Conflict:
British Perspectives” (paper was presented at the International Oral History Conference, Rome,
Italy, 23-26 June 2004) as presented in “The Falklands War”, seminar held 5 June 2002 (Centre
for Contemporary British History, 2005, http://www.icbh.ac.uk/witness/falklands/), 76
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inhabitants lived on the islands. 10 Due to the economic recession, Parliament
continuously debated on whether to minimize or terminate funding for defense for the
islands. Needless to say, the Falkland Islands were insignificant in the grand scheme of
British political affairs. However, this all changed when Argentina surprised the British
by invading on 2 April 1982. The Falklands were so insignificant that even the then
British Secretary of State for Defence John Nott conceded to having trouble identifying
the islands’ location on a map before the conflict.11 Nevertheless, the British responded
by sending their navy south to the Falkland Islands, resulting in the largest British naval
engagement since World War II.
The Junta, frustrated with British delay in transfer of sovereignty negotiations, had
faced severe internal political issues with a rapidly declining economy entailing an
inflation rate over 100 percent, staggering unemployment rates, and falling wages. 12
Seeking a diversion, General Leopoldo Galtieri, the Junta’s dictator, needed an outside
conflict to deflect public criticism of the government. Las Malvinas (the Argentine name
of the islands) provided this distraction. This was not surprising; since 6 March 1957, las
Malvinas, through formal decree, had been declared part of Argentine territory. This
same decree even proclaimed the islands’ inhabitants as Argentine citizens.13 Karl von

10

1980 census figures cited in Gordon Smith, Battle Atlas of the Falklands War (Denarth: NavalHistory.Net, 2006), 11
11
John Nott, “The Falklands War,” seminar held 5 June 2002 (Centre for Contemporary British
History, 2005 , http://www.icbh.ac.uk/witness/falklands/), 18
12
Arthur Gavshon and Barnett, Roger W., eds. Seapower and Strategy (Annapolis Naval Institute
Press, 1989), 14-18 as cited in LCDR Edward B. Zellem., “Clausewitz and Sea Power: Lessons of
the Falkland Islands War.” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama Air Command and Staff College Air
University, March 1999), 24
13
Peter Calvert, The Falklands Crisis: The Rights and the Wrongs, (London: Frances Pinter
Publishers, 1982), 37
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Clausewitz asserts in On War, in what probably his best known argument, that war is a
continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.14 The decision to
invade Malvinas provided the opportunity to divert internal political conflict and
legitimize the Junta with a common cause. In essence, this was continuing politics
through other means. It is also suggested that this invasion was intended to signal to
Chile that Argentina was prepared to back up not only its claims to las Malvinas, but also
other territorial claims, including the Beagle Channel, with force.15 In 1980, Pope John
Paul II mediated Chilean and Argentine claims to the Beagle Channel and eventually
ruled in Chile’s favor. Admiral Jorge Anaya, overall commander of the navy, the
extremely hawkish arm of the Argentine military, believed that control of the Cape Horn
area could be established after control of the Falklands was achieved. 16 The Argentine
Junta also argued that Argentina’s military operation was to “recover” the islands, not to
invade; a draft plan prepared for the “recovery” of Argentine territory had existed in
Argentine naval headquarters since 1960s.17 The military operation was to serve the
political goal of sparking negotiations for transfer of sovereignty.18

14

Karl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 605
15
Peter Beck, The Falkland Islands as an International Problem (London: Routledge, 1988) 73,
as cited in LCDR Edward B. Zellem,“Clausewitz and Sea Power: Lessons of the Falkland Islands
War,” 24
16
Sunday Times Insight Team, The Falklands War: The Full Story, (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers, 1982), 27
17
Ironically, it was prepared by then Captain Jorge Anaya. Hastings and Jenkins, 31
18
Major Rodolfo Pereyra, "Clausewitz and the Falkland Islands Air War," Air & Space Power
Journal, XX, no. 3 (2006), 113
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Figure 1. South Atlantic
9

10
Figure 2. The Falkland Islands

Due to defense budget cuts, the icebreaker HMS Endurance, last British naval
ship in the area, was to be pulled from the South Atlantic at the end of its 1981-1982 tour.
An essential link between the Falkland Islands and South Georgia Island, another British
claim, east of the Falklands, the Endurance was to be paid off and sold or scrapped after
the conclusion of her final patrol. The ship’s “premature retirement” was supposed to
save the Ministry of Defense about £3 million a year.19 This withdrawal announcement
was indeed public, even with Thatcher later describing Endurance as “a military
irrelevance,” suggesting that, “that it would neither deter nor repel an invasion.”20 While
it lacked military capabilities, it was not the “toothless tiger” it was made out to be.
Along with its’ excellent communication facilities, it was able to carry twenty or so
Royal Marines, launch two Wasp helicopters carrying air to surface missiles, and use her
two twenty millimeter cannons.21 The plan to withdraw the Endurance triggered two
reactions. First, the Falkland Islanders believed the British government was abandoning
them. Second, it signaled to the Argentines that British influence and desire to remain in
the region was waning.
The invasion of the Falkland Islands was two-fold. The conflict kicked off
preemptively on 19 March 1982 when approximately thirty Argentine metal salvagers,
led by Argentine businessman, Constantino Davidoff, illegally landed on South Georgia

Keith Speed, Sea Change: The Battle for the Falklands and the Future of Britain’s Navy (Bath:
Ashgrove Press Ltd, 1982), 111
20
Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, pg. 177 cited in Sir Lawrence Freedman, The Official
History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. I, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 224
21
Speed, 117
19
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Island and raised the Argentine flag. 22 Argentina sent one hundred troops to defend the
salvagers after the British responded by sending the icebreaker HMS Endurance to South
Georgia. Whether the Junta planned to include South Georgia in their invasion plans
remains a matter of debate. The Official History of the Falklands Campaign cites several
different sources that suggest the Junta did not initially plan the South Georgia invasion
but it intended “to take advantage to press her claim, and that if any Argentine workmen
resisting British attempts to move them were killed, a force would then be landed on the
Falkland Islands.”23 However, some sources argue that an Argentine naval special forces
unit infiltrated Davidoff’s ship, posing as scientists.24 This stems from the reported
September 1981 Argentina plan “Operation Alpha,” in which the Argentine navy would
use Davidoff’s business in South Georgia as a way to establish another base on the
disputed territory.25 Several former British commanders argue the Argentines were
caught off guard by the metal salvagers and forced to invade the Falkland Islands earlier
than intended. Nevertheless, by taking South Georgia, the Junta was forced to move their
Falkland Islands invasion plans up to April from September, fearing the British increase
in naval forces in the region.

22

The South Georgia Islands and the South Sandwich Island chain lay 900 miles east of the
Falklands. While they are a British overseas territory, the Argentines also claim sovereignty over
the islands.
23
Freedman, Vol. I, 220
24
Nick van de Bijl, Nine Battles to Stanley, (London: Leo Cooper, 1998), 8 as reported in
Freedman, Vol. I, 236
25
In 1976, the Argentines landed on South Thule, another island in the South Sandwich chain,
and built a small military base. The matter was never settled between Argentina and the British
before the outbreak of the Falklands War. Freedman, Vol. I, 169-170
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13
Figure 3. South Georgia Island

The South Georgia Island “incident”, as it is often referred to in British sources,
perplexed the British government: was this a precursor for a Falkland Islands invasion or
was this a minor diplomatic dispute? To add to the uncertainty, the annual Argentine
naval exercises with Uruguay, already announced by Buenos Aires and Montevideo,
caused even more confusion amongst the British. Prior to 31 March, the British did not
posses any firm evidence of the Argentine intention to invade the Falklands.26 However,
by Saturday, 1 April 1982, the Argentine missile corvettes Drummond and Granville
broke away from Uruguayan maneuvers and sailed south to join the Bahia Paraiso group
farther south. 27 By then, it was far too late for the British to block the Argentine fleet’s
movement. Falkland Islands Governor Rex Hunt observed: “it looks as if the buggers
mean it.”28
The actual invasion of the Falkland Islands, dubbed Operation ROSARIO,
centered at the capital of Port Stanley, was highly anti-climactic. The British garrison was
overwhelmed as it consisted of only two British Marine detachments, a total of 81 men,
alongside what was supposed to be a territorial defense force of 120 to defend the islands.
In fact only 23 showed up.29 The Argentine landing force arrived at 04:30 AM and
captured the Governor, who then ordered surrender of the British garrison. The
Argentines had captured the Falklands by 08:30AM on 2 April. Unable to contain their
26

Freedman, Vol. I, 216
Hastings and Jenkins, 60
28
Ibid, 72
29
Usually there was only one detachment on the Falklands; however at the time of the invasion,
there happened to be two detachments due to a scheduled rotation. The two detachments therefore
consisted of 69 Royal Marines, 11 Royal Navy personnel from the HMS Endurance and one exRoyal Marine then living on the Falklands who re-enlisted. See Sir Lawrence Freedman, The
Official History of the Falklands Campaign Vol. II, (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 4
27
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delight, the Junta announced the “recovery” of las Malvinas two hours before formal
surrender.30 In attempts to maintain good relations with the islanders and start political
negotiations with the British, the Argentine rules of engagement (ROE) mandated for the
occupation to be carried out without inflicting casualties and property destruction on the
British soldiers and the islanders.
On 24 January 1982, the influential columnist Jesús Iglesias Ruoca, writing in
Argentina’s leading paper, La Prensa, argued that “as far as the U.K. is concerned, there
might be a freezing of relations for a while, but in the context of Western strategic
interests it seems improbable that the situation would be prolonged.” 31 He described the
time for invasion as opportune for the recovery of the Malvinas, citing the presence of
less than 80 armed men in Port Stanley. Despite Ruoca’s prophecy, the Argentine
invasion of the Falklands caught the British intelligence and political community by
surprise. Numbed by constant threats of invasion since the 1960’s, the British had simply
grown accustomed to ignoring the Argentine rhetoric. Even when answering the House of
Commons as to why Argentines were able to invade successfully, Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher declared “it would have been absurd to dispatch the fleet every time
there was bellicose talk in Buenos Aires.”32

30

Hastings and Jenkins, 75
Sunday Times Insight Team, 25
32
Hastings and Jenkins, 78. Thatcher and the British government did not, however, take into
account that this was the approaching sesquicentennial anniversary of the British occupation of
the islands. This certainly was another motivator for the Argentines. See Welch, David A.
"Remember the Falklands? Missed Lessons of a Misunderstood War." International Journal. no.
3 (Summer 1997): 483-507
31
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Although the Argentines succeeded in conquering the islands relatively easily,
and despite the fact that they knew the British would eventually respond, they did nothing
to take advantage of their surprise. For example, they did not control or sever
communication lines between the islanders, a mistake soon made evident during the
British counter-invasion. In another instance, the runway at Port Stanley was too short for
many Argentine air force jets to land safely. Measuring 4,100 feet, the runway was just
barely long enough for the Super Etendard to land. However, this landing had a very
“small safety margin” when the runway was dry; when it was wet, landings would be
impossible.33 While they did build a system of lighting around the runway and taxiways,
the Argentines did little to lengthen the runway. Even in the month before the British
Task Force arrived in the South Atlantic, the Argentines had only managed to begin
extending the runway.34 According to Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, this wasn’t
because of logistical issues. Instead, the issue was morale on the ground as they quote a
soldier of the 7th Argentine Regiment saying that “until 1st of May [when the British
bombed the runway at Port Stanley], no one had really believed that we were going to
fight.”35 The Argentines’ passive conduct of the campaign suggested that “when
confronted with the devastating shock of a British military response that they had never
reckoned with, they pinned all of their hopes upon holding their ground and seeking
diplomatic, rather than military, deliverance.”36

33

Jeffery Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1983), 28
34
Army engineers had laid down steel plating to extend the runway by 200 feet. Ibid, 30.
35
Hastings and Jenkins, 286
36
Ibid, 286
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The theory that war is a continuation of politics by other means also applies to the
British reaction to the invasion. Not only was British sovereignty at stake with this
invasion but the British were worried that allowing the Argentines to seize the Falklands
as they did would establish a precedent for other governments who wanted to “reclaim”
British territory by force. Politically, to dissuade and discourage other nations from using
armed invasions to achieve political solutions, the British also sought and received the
United Nations Security Council condemnation of the Argentine invasion with the
passing of Resolution 502. Adopted by the Security Council on 3 April, the resolution
demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and a complete withdrawal by Argentine
Forces. It called for a diplomatic solution to the situation and it allowed the United
Kingdom to invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which allowed the British
to claim the right of self-defense. As Gavshon and Rice argue, the British government
now “had carte blanch to deal with Argentina, in the same way as a police force has carte
blanche to deal with an armed man holding hostages in a stolen car.”37 The British froze
Argentine assets, banned imports and suspended export credit and it was not long before
the United States and the European Economic Community (EEC) joined in these
measures. 38 Further political and diplomatic negotiations through the Americans,
Peruvians and other mediators were exhausted before the British used force. Charles
Koburger Jr. sums up the British strategy in three steps: (1) diplomacy through the United
Nations, (2) economic sanctions through the EEC and, (3) force, or blockade, with the
37

Gavshon and Rice, 37
The Americans waited to impose sanctions until after the Alexander Haig negotiations
concluded. Realizing he was dealing with “a regime quite unable to take coherent decisions, let
alone stick to them,” Haig returned to Washington D.C. on 19 April. Hastings and Jenkins, 112
38
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option of a landing if necessary. 39 Clausewitz theory holds true in this analysis: the
British threat of the use of force was a continuation of politics through other means.
Despite the failure to the heed warning signs for the invasion, the British still
heeded a vital Mahanian precept: “the influence of the government will be felt in its most
legitimate manner in maintaining an armed navy.” 40 The submarine HMS Conqueror
and Britain’s two aircraft carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible set on out 5 April
while the rest of the surface Task Force was on its way between 7- 9 April. The British
Task Force Fleet (CTF 137) fell under command of then Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward,
a former submarine commander. Woodward was given command of the Task Force
largely due to the fact that he was already with the majority of the British fleet in the
Gibraltar area, which was participating in the annual spring naval exercises. Also, since
he had served as assistant director of naval planning in the British Ministry of Defence,
he was aware of the contingency plans to recapture the islands if invaded.41 Thus, the
British were quickly able to launch Operation CORPORATE in response to the Argentine
invasion.
While some ships departed from Great Britain and others from the Mediterranean
area, the entire British fleet sailed toward Ascension Island, a tiny volcanic rock
formation between Brazil and Africa. The fleet convened there to re-supply and organize
before heading south on 16 April. The British government had already announced the
39

Charles Koburger, Jr. Sea Power in the Falklands, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 35
Captain A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783. (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1894), 82
41
This commander was Admiral Sandy Woodward. See Adm Sandy Woodward, One Hundred
Days (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1992), 88, 89 as cited in Major Rodolfo Pereyra, "Clausewitz
and the Falkland Islands Air War," Air & Space Power Journal, XX, no. 3 (2006): 111-119
40
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establishment of a Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) on 12 April. The circular zone was
centered on the Falklands and had a radius of 200 miles. Maintaining the same shape and
size, this zone evolved into the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) on 30 April. Any Argentine
warship or naval auxiliaries entering the MEZ could have been fired upon without
warning while any Argentine sea vessel, including military and civil, or aircraft entering
the TEZ was potentially subject to unannounced attack. Any foreign vessel or aircraft
entering the TEZ without permission from the British government was also subject to
attack. The MEZ was patrolled and enforced by British nuclear-powered submarines
(SSN) until the Task Force arrived and they were still used to enforce the TEZ. While the
MEZ and TEZ were not intended to strain the mainland Argentine economy directly, they
were designed to interfere with Argentine naval movements as well as to starve the
Argentine garrison on the Falklands. The British used the MEZ and TEZ to achieve
command of the sea.
Unfortunately for the commanders, the British government had not made its
intentions clear nor had it decided on a course to settle the dispute. Some politicians
advocated a landing on West Falkland (a relatively uninhabited part of the Falkland
Islands) so as to make a statement to Argentine dictator General Galtieri. However,
Margaret Thatcher argued that the Argentines “need to be pushed off,” and advocated for
planning that secured the recapture of Port Stanley on East Falkland. 42 On 25 April, a
detachment of the 3rd Commando Brigade, along with HMS Endurance, recaptured South
Georgia Island, subsequently sinking one of Argentina’s three submarines, the Santa
Frank Uhilg, Jr. “Amphibious Lessons,” in Military Lessons of the Falklands War: Views from
the United States, ed. Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, 58-59
42
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Fe.43 The submarine was sunk by an air-to-surface anti ship missile launched from a
British helicopter. The missile severely damaged the submarine, forcing the Argentine
crew to abandon her when she started listing. The raid on South Georgia again echoed
Clausewitz: the British government needed the bite of military action to convey a strong
threat of force. On 1 May 1982, with the British fleet entering the TEZ, the British air
force conducted raids on Port Stanley, targeting the airfield. While the runway was never
put out of commission, the Argentines did little to protect and improve it nonetheless.
The war in the Falklands was now underway.
The most controversial incident of the war occurred on 2 May when Admiral
Woodward ordered the sinking of the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano. The
cruiser and her accompanying destroyers were located on the southwestern side of the
TEZ, moving westward. With the Argentine carrier group, including the carrier 25th of
May, on the northern side of the TEZ, Woodward interpreted the Belgrano to be part of a
pincer movement. There were two issues: the Belgrano was located outside the TEZ and
thus fell outside of the Rules of Engagement (ROE), and her movements indicated the
cruiser group was heading toward the Argentine coast, not the British fleet. However, as
the British fleet only maintained two aircraft carriers; any damage to, or worse, the
sinking of either one, would cripple and potentially end the British effort to recover the
Falklands. Woodward concluded that “whether she is inside or outside the TEZ is
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irrelevant. She will have to go.”44 When Woodward ordered the Conqueror to sink the
Belgrano, the order was immediately denied and sent straight to London because it
blatantly violated the ROE. 45 Woodward maintains his order was intended to prompt
London to change the ROE and allow the Conqueror to attack the Belgrano as soon as
possible. Panic and consternation ensued in London when the signal reached
Commander-in-Chief Sir John Fieldhouse and Admiral Terence Lewin. However, the
message was received: Woodward needed the ROE changed and fast.
After a change in the ROE was issued from London, which allowed for the
sinking of enemy ships outside the TEZ, the SSN HMS Conqueror was ordered to sink
the ARA General Belgrano.46 After the ship was hit, some of the Belgrano’s
accompanying escorts gave chase to the Conqueror, while other ships such as the
destroyer Bouchard did not know what had happened, adding that “we did not observe
any explosions.”47 Only recently has it emerged that the Argentine command learned of
the sinking at midnight.48 Sadly, this resulted in a delay for the search and rescue of
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survivors, only exacerbating the disaster. In total, 321 Argentine men lost their lives.49
The consequences for the Argentines were much greater than just the lives lost. Admiral
Anaya, the hawk of the Argentine Junta, was keen on using his carriers after the sinking
of the Belgrano but because their fleet was deemed too much of a national asset to risk,
he was held back by his Junta colleagues. 50 It was now evident that the Junta was not as
unified as before. A single sinking by a British SSN sent the Argentine navy home for
good as the British fleet never saw any of the large Argentine warships again. With the
Junta’s credibility severely damaged, the British SSNs were able to patrol the seas of the
South Atlantic, virtually unopposed.
The sinking of the Belgrano erupted into controversy on 21 December 1982 when
Labour Party MP Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow) alleged that Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher and her Conservative government “coldly and deliberately gave the orders to
sink the Belgrano, in the knowledge that an honorable peace was on offer and in the
expectation--- all too justified—that the Conqueror’s torpedoes would torpedo the peace
negotiations.” 51 Mr. Dalyell was referring to the peace initiative the Peruvians had tried
to push forward between 1 and 2 May. Since the Belgrano was sunk on 2 May, the timing
of the situation suggested to many critics that the British chose to escalate the war
deliberately. However, due to time zone changes and communication issues, questions
remained as to whether the British government was aware of the peace plan. The
controversy only continued to grow as “government versions of the sinking have been
49
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inconsistent both in the factual details and in the military and political reasoning put
forward.”52 The debate over the known intelligence and justification of the sinking
continues today.
However, the Junta did attempt to save face. On 4 May, in retaliation for the
Belgrano sinking, the Argentine Fleet Air Arm Command ordered two Super Etendards,
armed with Exocet missiles, to attack the British Task Force. Largely due to deteriorating
weather conditions, no Argentine aircraft came within 200 nautical miles (nm) of the
British Task force between 2 and 3 May. To conduct further air raids on the islands, the
British Task Force maneuvered within located 40-55nm south-east of the Falklands.53
Three Type 42 destroyers were occupying air defense stations some 18nm west in front
of the main body of the task force: the HMS Glasgow, the HMS Sheffield and the HMS
Coventry. Unfortunately, the Task Force was without Airborne Early Warning (AEW)
upgrades due to the 1981 navy cuts, and the new Nimrod 3 AEW aircraft were not due to
enter service until 1983.54 The two Super Etendards were able to avoid outdated British
radar and launch two Exocet missiles. A single Exocet hit the Sheffield on the starboard
side, killing 20 men and injuring 26.
The loss of the Sheffield shocked both the military and London: the Sheffield was
the first British ship loss by direct hostile action since the Second World War. The Junta
was able to restore faith in campaign back at home, diverting attention from the Belgrano
sinking; however it would be short lived. For the British, the Sheffield sinking forced the
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country and government to realize the seriousness of the situation and the meaning of the
war.55 The sinking of the Sheffield served as a reminder that in the nuclear age, a third
world country was still able to inflict damage on a first world military. 56 The Task Force
was lucky: the Super Etendards were originally intended to find and attack either one of
the British aircraft carriers, the HMS Hermes or Invincible. The Argentines had control of
the early warning and fighter control radars at Port Stanley. These radars provided
information on positions of patrolling Sea Harriers and tracked aircraft moving to and
from the carriers, giving an indication of the whereabouts of the Task Group.57 However,
poor combat tactics and lack of training hampered the Argentine air force. Instead of
properly identifying the Type 42 frigates for what they were, the Argentine pilots simply
fired upon the first ships they spotted. Throughout the course of the war, the Argentine
air force developed a reputation for this; it was notorious for firing on the first ship
detected.
The Falklands presented a common, but difficult situation for both the Argentine
and British fleets. The Argentine air force mainland base was over 450 miles away from
the islands, while the British carriers provided the only means to launch British air
strikes. Therefore, the military historiographical issues pertaining to the Falklands War
focus on the British command of the sea and air. This is not unexpected especially given
the distance the British fleet had to travel to project power. As argued by Charles
Koburger Jr. in Sea Power in the Falklands, sea power’s form has continued to adjust to
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new weapons and tactics; however, the command of the sea is the most important fact for
a navy. Sea power, however gained and exercised, is defined as the ability to use the sea
as one likes, and to deny the use of the sea to the enemy.58 While he argues that overall
command of the sea was not achieved by the British, Koburger further suggests that the
proper application of tools—whatever tools, whether the tools are above, on, or below the
surface—to accomplish command is sea power. This conflict was the first to utilize
nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) and they became the favorite tool of the British navy.
As demonstrated above, the sinking of the General Belgrano by the HMS Conqueror had
a profound effect on the Argentine navy. SSNs patrolled off the Argentine coast to ward
off any potential ships and to pick up any radar signals transmitted by the Argentines.
The Argentine navy possessed only three conventional submarines prior to the start of the
conflict but besides the Santa Fe at South Georgia, they never significantly contributed to
the Argentine campaign. The Santa Fe was sunk on 25 April, the San Luis was in service
until 17 May and the Salta was never detected near the Falklands. Due to the numbers of
British ships lost, politicians and public interpretation often view the British attempts to
command the sea as failure. However, digressing from Koburger’s assessment, the
British did maintain command of the sea: the carriers were never threatened after the
Belgrano sinking as the Argentine navy remained close to home throughout the
remainder of the war.
The command of the sea and air are intertwined in naval wars. However, the
historiography regarding the British command of the air is much more critical than it is of
58
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the command of the sea. A frequent argument is that because the Royal Navy never
gained superiority in the air, it could not claim command of the sea.59 Anthony
Cordesman suggests that the “Argentines did a highly credible job opposing the first
major British landing…they forced the two British carriers to operate outside the range of
the Argentine air force…”60 He also suggests that despite turning back 261 out of 505
Argentine sorties and killing 140 of those aircraft that did enter the exclusion zone, the
British did not maintain command of the air because the Argentines were able to evacuate
their wounded with Hercules C-130s on the last day of fighting around Port Stanley.61 In
this instance, Cordesman is correct: Woodward did not have command of the air before
he arrived to the area. Although they were able to support the fleet and ground troops
from afar, Woodward had to keep his carriers as far east as possible as even damage to
one carrier would have crippled the entire British campaign. Max Hastings and others
argued in joust that the Admiral should have been awarded the South Africa Star for
positioning the Task Force so far east.62
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Figure 4. Loss of British ships

Admiral Woodward’s immediate superior, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Leach,
echoed Koburger’s assessment of the sea power, agreeing that air superiority for the
region as a whole was never achieved by British forces for the entire duration of the
war.63 Leach points out that because the Argentine air force never flew out in full force,
total air supremacy could never be achieved. Rather, he offers a very different
interpretation of air command suggesting that British air power was instead “locally
superior” during the war. Leach’s phrase requires further analysis. He is suggesting that
command of the air need not be defined geographically, whereas, it should be defined by
mission accomplishment. In this instance, British forces only needed superior air power
when defending their carriers or protecting ground forces during the invasion of East
Falkland. The carriers were never seriously threatened throughout the war by the
Argentine air force. As well, while ships were lost, including the HMS Ardent, Antelope,
Coventry, Atlantic Conveyor and Sir Galahad, disembarking troops and subsequent
movement on East Falkland towards Port Stanley were never adequately threatened by
the Argentine air force. If the Belgrano and 25th of May had carried out their pincer
movement on the carriers, the British campaign to recover the islands would have been
severely crippled, if not destroyed. No further potential catastrophe involving the British
navy and army and the Argentine air force ever materialized during the Falklands War.
The British were able to ensure mission accomplishment with the Sea Harriers, as
they were critical in the landing on East Falkland so “that logistics could move forward
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prior to the establishment of an air defense umbrella.”64 Since many British ships lacked
airborne early warning systems (AEW) and because the British carriers were not suited
for larger aircraft, the Sea Harriers’ role in the war was crucial. Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred
Price argue in Air War South Atlantic that the Sea Harrier’s reputation as an effective
plane rose after the war. During combat, the loss ratio of Argentine aircraft to Sea
Harriers was 23:1, despite Argentina possessing three times as many jets and aircraft.65
Despite having home-field, with multiple bases along the Argentine coast and even with
Port Stanley airfield, the Argentine air force still suffered high attrition rates while two
British aircraft carriers provide suffice to support and maintain the entire operation. The
air war in the South Atlantic exhibited “both the power of the defense and the continuing
need for an articulate strategy.”66
Regardless of the debates over command of the sea and air, the amphibious
invasion of the Falklands commenced with Operation SUTTON when 5,000 men of the
3rd Commando Brigade landed at San Carlos, East Falkland, on 21 May. Seeking a
quick and decisive victory, British politicians pressured the British military to decide on
an invasion point rather quickly.67 Both Port Stanley and Berkley Sound were too
heavily defended with over 10,000 Argentines. Reluctantly, the Commando Brigade
chose San Carlos water with the goal of capturing the Goose Green settlement. Of course
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the ground commanders were worried about their own men, but the failure to capture
Goose Green would have been a political blow, not a military blow. Since the ground
combat stage of the war was marred by the sinking of several British transport ships,
historians argue that the British began their ground assault with neither control of the sea
nor air, a consequence of “politics driving the campaign.” 68 The Argentines could have
targeted Goose Green but because of command, morale and intelligence issues within
their own military, did not. Therefore, the Argentines allowed the British to come to
them in Port Stanley, failing to shape the war for themselves.
Operation SUTTON, the British amphibious invasion, was a two pronged attack:
2nd Para were to head to Goose Green while 45 Commando and 3rd Para were to hike
towards Port Stanley.69 A major setback for the British invasion occurred when the
transport ship Atlantic Conveyer, carrying vital Chinook helicopters, was hit. It sunk,
taking down all but one Chinook. The Commando units were then forced to “yom” their
way through peat bog, stone and mountains towards their objectives. 70 Air superiority
was accomplished as the Sea Harriers were able to maintain local superiority against 200
Argentine land based aircraft.71 The British were surprised to discover that the Argentines
had not established control of civilian communications, allowing British soldiers to call
other units via telephones in settlers’ homes in different villages to trade intelligence.
68
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By 11 June, supported by naval gunfire from the British navy, which had moved
from San Carlos, British soldiers captured the mountain tops surrounding Port Stanley.
By the night of 13 June, the British were advancing on Port Stanley, encircling Argentine
forces. The Argentines formally surrendered on 14 June 1982, marking the end of the
war. The occupation of the Falklands by the Argentines was over in less than one
hundred days. Over 11,848 Argentine prisoners were sent home and the British flag was
raised once again at the Governor’s mansion. Admiral Woodward refused to meet with
Argentine ground commander General Mario Benjamin Menéndez, claiming his anger
with the General was so great that “I could not trust myself to observe the full
requirements of the Geneva Convention.”72 Woodward believed that “the man should
have packed it in the day he found out the British had landed” and that the General’s
“incompetence of his defense, along with his lack of perseverance” had delayed the
inevitable and resulted in more deaths than necessary.73
After the conclusion of the war, questions arose in Parliament regarding danger
signs of an impending Argentine invasion and how they had been apparent for some time.
Parliamentary debates also argued that prudent government “would have acted
accordingly.”74 However, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign would later
determine that the British had no firm evidence of Argentine intention to invade prior to
31 March.75 Overall, British power was applied to the Falklands problem in six graduated
phases, each signaling resolve, blending into the next phase: (1) advance into the South
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Atlantic (2) blockade and isolation (3) reconnaissance; (4) recapture of South Georgia;
(5) raids on the Falklands by commandos and aircraft; (6) recapture of the Falklands.76
Hindered by the political wrangling back in London, the British military was able to
achieve the near- impossible: travel over 8,000 nautical miles from home base, repossess
the Falkland Islands in less than one hundred days, and still survive with fewer casualties
than predicted.
As the Americans discovered in Vietnam, the British military quickly realized the
media could be both friend and foe. Like American General George Patton, Admiral
Woodward was extremely vocal and critical regarding many politicians and political
decisions. British media were especially captivated by him, capitalizing on his outbursts
and outspokenness with headlines including “Woodward Forecasts a Long and Bloody
War” and “Walkover Woodward.”77 Woodward also expressed his distaste for the
information the BBC World Service inadvertently provided for the Argentine military,
supplying almost all of their intelligence about British activities.78 For example, the
BBC announced the rendezvous point for Battle and Amphibious groups who were to
lead the landing invasion. The Commanding Officer of 2 Para, Lieutenant Colonel H.
Jones, wanted to sue John Nott, the Prime Minister, the Defense Secretary and the BBC,
charging them with manslaughter.79 Sadly, Colonel Jones was killed when leading 2 Para
towards Goose Green and in that case, the BBC again prematurely announced that the
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“PARAS ARE MOVING TOWARDS DARWIN.”80 The headline resulted in Argentines
forces reinforcing the area, forcing the British to encounter more unexpected resistance.
According to Woodward, there are still some who believe that the BBC report was
directly responsible for the Argentine “ambush” that resulted in Colonel Jones’ death.
While the Americans desired to remain neutral, there was undoubtedly an interest
in the war as well. However, Woodward would have most likely expressed similar
distaste for the American media as some reports published echoed the BBC’s reporting
style. The New York Times published headlines including “Ships said to move to a new
formation” and “Likely Moves in an Attack.”81 Even the British Economist and the
Washington Post published extremely detailed reports from British sources stating that
Argentine bombs were not fused properly, thus lowering the chance of denotation. 82 It is
therefore evident that the British and American media showed little to no restraint when
publishing privileged information. British journalists even turned to the American media
to complain of their treatment and handling by the British government. For example,
Brian Hanrahan of the BBC complained to The New York Times that Woodward’s
intention was to “cause as much confusion to the enemy as possible, and if there any way
he could use us as part of the attempt, he intended to do so.”83 As British Secretary of
State for Defence John Nott described the media: “…you are taught that you have to love
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and co-operate with the press….the press are nothing but a pain in the arse! Whatever the
circumstance, they will do their very utmost to make a military operation almost
impossible.”84
Despite the small size of the war, and its limited relevance for world affairs, the
historiography surrounding the Falklands War is extensive. American historians and
sources tend to be extremely critical of the Falklands War, with some arguing that “it did
not provide a long list of general lessons for future wars.” 85 Even American military
members were skeptical of the Falklands War lessons. For example, U.S. Admiral Harry
Train, then the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, told Admiral Woodward in
September if 1982 that “there [were] no lessons to be learnt from your little war. Well no
new ones anyway.”86 While important, Argentine sources are problematic as many
demonstrate a propagandistic nature. This issue will likely continue until las Malvinas are
an Argentine possession. Generally, South Americans show solidarity with their
Argentine neighbors who, in their view, have been “wronged”. These South American
sources need to be treated with caution as support for Argentina’s claims before, during,
and decades after the war are still overwhelmingly unified in the continent.
British accounts often focus on certain areas of the war: the British campaign,
Argentine campaign, Ministry of Defence issues, the media and the politicians’ war. 87
However, some works were published before government inquiries or reports were
concluded. Therefore, much of the earlier historiographical content consisted of
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journalistic narratives and is often lacking in critical analysis. For example, Dr. Peter
Calvert’s work heavily relies on The Times and The Guardian for sources and materials.
Overall, works published by journalists, including those of Max Hastings and Simon
Jenkins and The Sunday Times Insight Team, are extremely insightful. Notably, Hastings,
who was a BBC war correspondent during the war, is especially critical of the military
brass he worked with.88 Within the political historiography, readers need to assess the
author’s political bias as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative
government were either loved or hated. There really was, and still is, no in between, even
to this day.
The historiography will only continue to grow as government documents from
The British National Archives (TNA) have just been released, in accordance with
protocol to withhold documents until after the thirty year mark passes. These new
documents shed light on the extensive diplomatic and political affairs of the war and
detail the extensive military planning for the Task Force. The documents give further
insight for the media-government relations as well as foreign implications before and
during the war. More importantly, the documents give substantial justification for the
British government’s decision to sink the Belgrano, giving further reason to discard the
escalation-of-war conspiracies.
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CHAPTER III
THE SINKING OF THE ARA GENERAL BELGRANO
A man does what he must - in spite of personal consequences, in spite of obstacles and
dangers and pressures - and that is the basis of all human morality.
-

Winston Churchill

War cannot be a game of chess, with absolute rules of play. It is a paradox that even a
just war can never be moral, but the overall good resulting from success can exceed the
total sum of the evils. 89
- Mr. Colin Croskin

Although they were surprised by the invasion, the British immediately determined
that the Argentine navy posed the greatest threat towards the recovery of the Falklands.
The British Chiefs of Staff correctly concluded that “the Argentine navy would probably
put to sea in order not to lose face.”90 To combat this, the British established a circular
200 mile maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) centered around the islands on 12 April, which
would “[demonstrate] our political will and could result in the sinking of major
Argentinian warships.”91 Centered at latitude 51° 41’ South and longitude 59° 31’ West,
the advantage of a circle was its precision, leaving no room for ambiguities in
interpretation as the awkward shape of a territorial zone would have.92 The size was
judged sufficient to provide enough room to be able to signal to a ship to stop, give chase
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if it did not and if need be, fire a shot across the bow if it continued forward.93 The MEZ
stated that any Argentine warship or naval auxiliary inside the MEZ was subject to attack
by British nuclear-powered submarines (SSN).94 The majority of the British Task Force,
including the carrier and amphibious groups, set sail for the Falklands on 5 April, while
the rest of the fleet set sail between 7-9 April. Due to distance, it would require over three
weeks travel for the surface vessels to reach the islands. Due to the SSN’s faster travel
speed, the MEZ announcement emphasized the threat of the SSN. When the rest of the
Task Force neared the Falklands, including the aircraft carriers, the MEZ was enhanced.
On 30 April, the same circular boundary was upgraded to the Total Exclusion Zone
(TEZ) in which any Argentine ship, including naval, merchant and civil ships, or aircraft
that was assessed to be a threat to the British Task Force was subject to unannounced
attack. The TEZ also stated that any foreign vessel or aircraft entering the zone was
subject to attack. Argentine ships outside the MEZ and TEZ were not covered by those
rules and thus outside the rules of engagement (ROE) for the British. The MEZ and TEZ
were incentives for Argentine units not to try to reach the Falklands, thus cutting off
supplies for the Argentine garrison stationed there.95 Overall, the Argentines abided by
the British MEZ and TEZ. Although some ships were able to skirt around the boundary
before entering the zone and drop off supplies, no major component of the Argentine
navy ever made it to the Falkland Islands. Clearly, the Argentine navy feared the SSNs
and wisely chose not to test British patience.
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The Argentine military Junta was dominated by the hawkish navy but in spite of its
efforts to present an image of power and prowess, the navy had only one aircraft carrier,
the Veinticinco de Mayo or the 25th of May. The pride of Admiral Anaya’s fleet, she was
named after Argentina’s 25 May 1810 revolution. She was an “old aircraft carrier,” but
was still a respectable threat as she was able to “carry 7 to 9 A4 Skyhawk and, possibly,
up to 5 Super Etendard aircraft.”96 The British aircraft carrier situation was not much
better than the Argentines, as only two aircraft carriers remained in the British fleet, the
HMS Hermes and the HMS Invincible. Damage or loss of either carrier would threaten
the entire British campaign to recover the islands and even with only 25th of May, the
“Argentines are thus able to threaten our forces from the air at a great distance from the
Argentine mainland.”97 The British were especially worried about the carrier threatening
the main amphibious task force, supply vessels and operations aircraft traveling to and
from Ascension Island.98 The Skyhawks’ and Super Etendards’ combat radius of 500
nautical miles posed a serious and immediate threat to “to all ships engaged in operations
in the Falklands area but particularly to those ships on passage to and from Ascension
Island.”99 For the overall campaign, the British sought similar action against the
Argentine air force but “with limitations on mainland airfields, such action will be
restricted to air engagements and attacks on the ground in the Falklands.”100
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Subsequently, the British determined that the destruction of the 25th of May would be a
way to establish sea control given their own air force restrictions. It was then declared
that “the best defense, therefore, would be to neutralize the carrier itself.”101
The Ministry of Defense (MoD) considered five options for dealing with the 25th of
May:
a. To sink the carrier as soon as possible, wherever she is;
b. To sink the carrier if any attack was made on our Naval or Air Forces by any
Argentine Unit;
c. To induce the “25th of May” to return to port and stay there;
d. To induce the “25th of May” to stay within the Argentina internationally
recognized territorial waters of 12 nautical miles offshore and north of 43°S;

525 nautical miles separated the Falkland Islands from 43°S
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e. To confine the “25th of May” within an area bounded by the parallel 43°S and the
Rhumb-line connecting the positions 43°S 56°W and 23°S 35°W.102

Option e would have kept the 25th of May North and West of the indicated lines.
Recognizing the carrier could also threaten travel to and from Ascension Island, Option e
was drawn up.103 The Rhumb-line would have forced the Argentine carrier to travel a
considerable and ill-advised distance before attacking the island. Any attack at this range
would have been inconceivable. Options c, d, e were contingent on the British issuing a
warning for the 25th of May to return to port within 48 hours and the Argentines doing so.
Militarily, these options were “less attractive” than Options a or b because the British
were not sure they could actually enforce them.104

102

TNA: FCO 7/4609, Military Threat Posed to British Forces by the Argentine Aircraft Carrier
“25th of May” Note by MoD
103
Ascension Island is located at 8°S 14°W
104
Ibid

40

Following the Argentine invasion, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher established
a small War Cabinet, which was to take charge of the conduct of the war, called the
Overseas and Defense Committee, South Atlantic (ODSA). ODSA was comprised of
Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, Secretary for Defense John Nott, Home Secretary Willie
Whitelaw and Tory Party Chairman Cecil Parkinson. Like the MoD, they listed five
possible options for neutralizing the aircraft carrier:
a. To sink the carrier as soon as possible wherever she is on the high seas. No
warning;
b. To sink the carrier immediately if our own naval/air forces were attacked by
Argentine forces, regardless of whether or not the carrier was involved in the
attack. A prior warning of our intention to adopt a generalized retaliatory
posture of this kind could be given. The CNS [Chiefs of Staff Committee]
would like the ROEs for the submarine outside the TEZ to be changed (at
present it can only attack other conventional submarines) in order that the
submarines could carry out this task ;
c. To issue a warning to the Argentines that the carrier should be returned a port
and remain there. If they did not do this, the carrier would be sunk;
d. To issue a warning that the carrier should remain within the Argentine
internationally recognized territorial waters (ie. 12 miles) and north of 43°S;
e. To issue a warning that the carrier should be kept within a demarcated sea
boundary for which co-ordinates would be given. This would keep its aircraft
out of range of the British task force both in transit on the high seas and within
the TEZ.105
Since the Argentine navy only possessed conventional submarines, it is important to note
the word “conventional” in Option b. There were concerns about Soviet SSNs in the area
and it was highly unlikely the Soviets would send a conventional submarine in the region.
It was vital that the British did not fire upon any other SSN: it would most likely be a
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Soviet submarine.106 The British were exceptionally concerned about international
reaction to any potential sinking. Particularly, they were worried about tipping the Cold
War superpowers, the Americans and Soviets, who were maintaining neutral stances,
towards the Argentine cause. Contingency plans for unrestricted attacks against
Argentine naval units and military aircraft more than 12 miles from the Argentine coast
were wisely disregarded. Since the British navy was that much more capable than the
Argentine navy, this option was given a “high visibility of success.”107 However,
unrestricted warfare could “engender Organization of American States (OAS) world
reaction against the UK; could alienate our friends and engender increasing political
pressures at home.”108 Worse, it could “spread the conflict area, arouse adverse
international reaction,” and allow for “possible reprisals, or unrestricted mob attacks
against UK civilians on [the Argentine] mainland.”109 Instead, the British asserted that it
was “entitled, in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense as recognized in Article
51of the United Nations Charter, to take appropriate measures to protect its forces as well
as its territory.”110
Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) Legal Adviser Sir Ian Sinclair and his
deputy J.R. Freeland led the British consideration of the potential legal ramifications of
any potential sinking. Some diplomats, such as Sir Antony Acland, advocated surprise
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SSN attacks, with a self-defense cover story, to announce “in unmistakable fashion that
British submarines had arrived in the area.” 111 Determining that “the Legal Adviser
would be unhappy about [this],” the MoD opted for and backed the less contentious
Option b.112 While the Legal Advisers determined that the MoD Option e was the most
defensible course in a legal point of view, they eventually conceded and agreed with the
MoD on Option b. The Legal Advisers attached conditions to their decision, stating that
“a carrier remaining sufficiently far North and West of the TEZ and the supply route
would not pose an immediate threat to the British forces, and since we are relying on our
right of self defense, it should not be attacked in a place where it does not constitute such
a threat.”113 ODSA also concluded their own Option b was “tantamount to challenge the
Argentines” and added that “it is not a strict interpretation of self-defense, in a sense that
the sinking of the carrier eg. by a SSN could well occur in circumstances wholly removed
in time and place from the Argentine action regarded as precipitating it. A prior warning
of our general intention to act in this way could only partially mitigate the difficulty.”114
Both the MoD and ODSA agreed that a pre-emptive warning to the Argentines was
needed to satisfy both internal and external political figures and likely criticisms. On 23
April, the British passed a warning via the Swiss to the Argentines and in turn, the
Argentines promptly responded with their own communique declaring “that it would treat
as hostile all British shipping within 200 miles of the Argentine coast and within a 200
111
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mile radius of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.”115 To
cover their bases and appease the Opposition116 and anti-war pundits, the ODSA
concluded that before “an incident occurs requiring public comment to pre-empt or rebut
Argentine criticism, we should publish the terms of the warning immediately from News
Department, adding that it was conveyed formally to the Argentines before the incident in
question took place.”117 By 30 April, the British had prepared a draft statement to be
issued if the aircraft carrier was to be crippled or sunk without warning.118
The British government was fully prepared, politically, legally and militarily, to
sink the Argentine carrier inside the TEZ. While the argument could be made that the
TEZ was a political cover or ploy for further escalation by the British government, the
government documents clearly signal a fear that the Argentine carrier might damage or
even sink one of the British carriers. The main objective was to retrieve the Falkland
Islands, and the loss of either the HMS Hermes or Invincible, or worse, both, “would
adversely affect command and control. It could give the Argentines local air superiority,
if not over the Force, then over the Falkland Islands. Support for our land operations
would be limited.”119 Not only was the Task Force at sea threatened, but “as a condition
for landing operations, early action needs to be taken to nullify Argentine naval forces,
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particularly the carrier and submarines.”120 To protect the Task Force, to prevent
unnecessary loss of life and to launch a landing operation to recover the islands, the
British government decided that if the 25th of May entered the TEZ, it had to be sunk.
By the end of April 1982, the preparation and decision to sink the Argentine
carrier was completed. Although both the MoD and ODSA agreed that the Task Force
should only sink the carrier within the TEZ, there was considerable gray area in regards
to the carrier’s assessed threat level. The MoD was especially concerned that the carrier
might move into position outside the TEZ and then attack forward into the TEZ, quickly
threatening the British Task Force. This worry suggests the question: why would any
Argentine ship enter the TEZ, fully knowing they increased their chances for detection
and potential attack due to the higher number of British patrols in the area? If the British
were not to attack outside the TEZ, wouldn’t the Argentine navy then maneuver to attack
the outside the TEZ? The British did not want to take chances losing contact with any
Argentine ship, fearing it would then be able to take a direct or quicker approach to the
British Task Force by entering the TEZ. An example of this would be for the British to
lose contact of any Argentine ship passing over the Burdwood Bank. Located at the edge
of the South American continental shelf, it runs about 200 hundred miles from east west.
South of the Falklands, the Atlantic is more than two miles deep, however, the slopes
leading up to the continental shelf reach a general depth of about 300 hundred feet. In the
bank, the depth climbs to a shallow 150 feet. This area is particularly dangerous for a
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submerged submarine trying to stay with a ship travelling at more than twenty-five
knots.121 To avoid leaving a “clear wake of disturbed water” on the surface, a submarine
needs to travel at a minimum of 200 hundred feet.122 Anything higher than that and the
Argentines would have been alerted to the submarine’s presence. If any Argentine ship
cut across the Burdwood Bank, the British submarine would be forced to break contact
and swing around the bank. By then, the Argentine ship would be long gone.
Therefore, the British ROE for the use of the SSNs outside the TEZ was altered.
In the early stages of planning the ROE for the SSNs outside the TEZ was confined to
“SSN Rule One —covert surveillance only—and the SSN may only take offensive action
in self defense or against conventional submarines it may detect (Rule five).” 123
However, amending the ROE for SSNs was advocated by the MoD to include “for the
possibility of submarine attack on the aircraft carrier” outside the TEZ. 124 On 1 May,
ODSA decided to authorize an attack “without warning on the Argentine aircraft carrier
outside our exclusion zone” and a new notification to the Argentine government was
prepared. 125 The MoD also assessed that the “SSN would give the greatest chance of
success with the least prejudice to other operations.”126 Clearly, the SSN was the favorite
option by the British government: it could operate both covertly and quickly and the
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Argentines could not easily counter the SSN since their own fleet did not posses any
SSNs.127 However, assessing the carrier’s threat and deciding whether to use SSNs
outside the TEZ were ultimately left by both the MoD and ODSA to the Task Force
Commander, Rear-Admiral John Forster “Sandy” Woodward. It was determined that
Woodward was “to have the same flexibility in using SSNs as he already has for surface
ships and aircraft…or the decision made on the neutralizing of the carrier.” 128 In an effort
to excuse themselves from any wartime decisions, the MoD placed responsibility on
Woodward to decide which of their five proposed options to use to neutralize the carrier.
Politely, they stated that “[whichever] option is preferred, it would be for the Task Group
Commander to decide how to enforce it.”129 However, little did they, or Woodward
know, that his assessment and decision would ultimately change the course of the
campaign. It also produced the most controversial incident of the entire Falklands War.
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To me an unnecessary action, or shot, or casualty, was not only waste but sin.
-

T. E. Lawrence

1 May marked the start of combat operations in the Falklands War with the British
bombing the Port Stanley airfield. The British Task Force was approximately 140
nautical miles (160 miles) east south east from Port Stanley or 70 nautical miles (81
miles) from the center of the TEZ. Since Sea Harriers were participating in the raid, the
carriers were located well within the TEZ. On the afternoon of 1 May, Commander
Christopher Wreford-Brown of the HMS Conqueror informed his superiors that he had
spotted the cruiser ARA General Belgrano and her escorting destroyers.130 She was
located on the southwestern edge, thirty miles outside the TEZ and travelling eastward in
between Isla de los Estados and Burdwood Bank. The Belgrano’s speed was 32 knots
(60km/h) while her two destroyers, the Piedra Buena and Hipólito Bouchard had a
speed of 34 knots (63 km/h).131 By early morning of 2 May, Sea Harriers also made
contact on the north-western side of the TEZ, detecting the Argentinian Carrier Battle
Group: the 25th of May and her escort of five ships. However, the Sea Harriers had been
“illuminated” by Argentine Sea Dart tracking radar and were forced to quickly peel
away.132 Because the Sea Harriers were forced to peel away, they were unable to pin
point the location of the carrier group. All that was known about the location of the
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Argentine carrier group was that it was outside the TEZ, about 200 miles to the northwest of the British Task Force, which was on the TEZ boundary due east of the
Falklands. The Belgrano group was also 200 miles away to the south-west from the Task
Force. However, what made the groups extremely dangerous was that both carried Exocet
missiles. The missiles contained a 364-pound warhead and had a 650 knot impact
velocity. Their range when launched from Super Etendard aircraft was 50-70km (30-45
miles) and launched from a ship, the range was around 42 km (26 miles).
1 May Intelligence reports did not ease British concerns. The British intercepted a
signal from Admiral Lombardo to all Argentine units, urging an early reconnaissance
followed by a massive attack on the British fleet before any units had a chance to
withdraw.133 Another intercepted message from Admiral Lombardo to Rear-Admiral
Gualter Allara, the Argentine Commander at Sea, detailed orders for the carrier group to
find British units and launch air attacks against them at first light on of 2 May.134 For the
British, their worst fear was materializing: the carrier was in position and attempting to
launch an air strike on the British Task Force. However, the Argentine carrier group’s
location could not be accurately pin-pointed and even the SSNs, HMS Spartan and
Superb, both of which were in the area, had no luck finding the exact location of the
carrier. Woodward assessed that Rear-Admiral Allara was attempting a classic pincer
movement on the British Task Force with the carrier group descending from the north
and the Belgrano group moving from the south. Therefore, Woodward cautiously moved
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his carriers to within 29 nautical miles (26 miles) of the eastern boundary of the TEZ as
to lengthen the distance for the Argentines to travel.135
Woodward’s assessment stemmed from a joint naval training exercise in November
1981 with Greek, French, American and Omani navies in the Persian Gulf. A particular
exercise called for Woodward to give chase, detect and attack the carrier USS Coral Sea.
The carrier’s radar systems were able to detect an enemy surface ship more than 200
miles away and launch six missile-launching aircraft. Woodward’s destroyer did not have
these capabilities; however he did not need modern technology to carry out the mission.
He split his forces, sending the frigates towards the carrier on one side of the exclusion
zone. He then maneuvered his destroyer, the Glamorgan, away from the Americans who
were centered in a well-defended exclusion zone. Since Woodward feinted movement
away from the carrier, the Americans lost contact with the Glamorgan. Instead, the
Americans shifted focus on finding and “destroying” the frigates, which they successfully
did. While the Americans were chasing the frigates, Woodward reversed course, turned
toward the carrier, swinging around the opposite side of the exclusion zone. The
Americans were never able to find the destroyer and Woodward was able to move the
undetected Glamorgan into firing position, just eleven miles away (17.7km) from the
carrier, and “fire” four Exocet missiles. Completely catching the Americans by surprise,
the Glamorgan was so close that the Coral Sea could not “chaff up,” or launch counter
measures. In war, the USS Coral Sea would have been another ship at the bottom of the
135
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sea. Despite losing one claw of the pincer, the other part of the pincer was able to
accomplish the mission. Woodward summarized lessons of the exercise:
The first was to beware of becoming over-engrossed in one area of
operations at the risk of ignoring another. The second was that, in a
limited war, in perfect weather, under the cover of the darkness, one fairly
old destroyer or cruiser, or whatever, is capable of getting right up to
within eleven miles of a modern strike carrier in a full battle group. We
had just done so from over two hundred miles away even in the face of
Airborne Early Warning Aircraft up over the top and an armada of strike
aircraft against us. We had proved that it could be done.136

What was materializing in the South Atlantic on 2 May 1982 was exactly what had
happened in November 1981, and Woodward immediately recognized this. The
Belgrano group needed to be within 42km of the Task Force to launch the Exocet
missiles since the group did not possess aircraft. However, this distance did not ease
Woodward’s mind. If the British lost contact with her, she could emerge just as
Woodward did against the Americans and by then, it would have been too late for
defensive measures. Woodward concluded: “I cannot let that cruiser even stay where she
is, regardless of her present course or speed. Whether she is inside or outsize the TEZ is
irrelevant. She will have to go.”137
The ROE were clear: no Argentine ship was to be attacked without provocation
outside the TEZ. To protect his own carriers, the HMS Invincible and Hermes,
Woodward needed the ROE changed immediately because he couldn’t locate the 25th of
May. Therefore, it was necessary to “take out one claw of the pincer.”138 However, by 2
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May 0811Z, the Belgrano changed course and started travelling westward, outside the
TEZ.139 This did not change Woodward’s interpretation of the unfolding events as he
knew that “speed and direction of an enemy ship can be irrelevant, because both can
change quickly. What counts is his position, his capability and what I believe to be his
intention.”140 Woodward deduced that the Belgrano was just feinting a move away from
the TEZ. Instead, the Admiral thought the Belgrano’s Captain Hector Bonzo was biding
time and waiting for the command to enter the TEZ, travel across the shallow Burdwood
Bank and attack the bulk of the British Task Force.
Woodward ordered Commander Wreford-Brown to attack the Belgrano, but as
expected, the order was immediately rejected as it clearly violated the ROE.141 The issue
was relayed up to Commander-in-Chief Sir John Fieldhouse and Admiral of the Fleet
Lord Terence Lewin. After consultation with the Prime Minster and the War Cabinet,
who agreed with Woodward’s assessment of the situation, the ROE were amended. Once
the order came through, Commander Wreford-Brown needed to make a decision and
quickly. The HMS Conqueror carried two types of torpedoes: the newly developed and
wire-guided Tigerfish torpedo, a single shot weapon that required a longer range to
activate, and the older, short-range Mark 8** torpedo. The dilemma the Commander
faced was either to use the new but somewhat unreliable torpedo from a safer distance or
139
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the older and reliable torpedo that required a shorter range. He decided to use the Mark
8** torpedo, as despite its shorter range, which increased the chances of his submarine
being detected, its consistent reliability left it favored by submarine commanders. 1380
yards away, the commander gave the order to his Fire Controller to shoot at the target:
the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. Three torpedoes were launched, resulting in
large, fireball producing explosions. There was no time for the Conqueror to hang around
and assess the aftermath once the hits had been confirmed, as she needed to avoid the
Belgrano’s accompanying destroyers and their revenge-seeking depth-charges. With her
rudder hard over, the submarine dove deep into the South Atlantic. As for the Belgrano, a
fireball consumed a large portion of the ship; she rolled over and sank. Since her
destroyers were giving chase to the Conqueror, and because the other Argentine escort
ships fled the area, rescue efforts were severely delayed. In total, 321 Argentine men
perished, resulting in the largest loss of life in the Falklands War. By 22:45Z on 2 May,
the British Armed Forces Headquarters in Northwood confirmed to the rest of the British
Task Force that the HMS Conqueror had sunk the General Belgrano.142
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Figure 5. The sinking of the General Belgrano

The sinking of the General Belgrano forced the retreat of and confined the Argentine
navy within twelve miles off the Argentine coast. Immediately after the sinking it was
reported that “Argentine aircraft carrier group was in-shore of area Oscar, within 50
fathoms and enjoying close air cover from the mainland…The frigate group north of
Puerto Deseado had also drawn in closer to the coast. As for the BELGRANO group,
there had been no report of destroyer activity since yesterday morning. .”143 Admiral
Anaya wanted the remaining part of the pincer to continue on its mission but the 25th of
May “commander had apparently questioned his order to move forward and launch air
attack and had pulled back for reasons of weather and military prudence.”144 The
Belgrano sinking shattered the Junta’s confidence in the navy and Admiral Anaya’s navy
was never the same. The British backed off too as the “Attorney-General had discussed
the matter with the Prime Minister and had concluded that another attack against the
Argentine carrier in current circumstances was unlikely to happen in circumstances
which would leave us exposed to legal or military reproach.”145 Unless the Argentine
carrier group moved to attack, it was to be left alone. However, the objective was already
achieved: the Argentine navy was successful neutralized.
The sinking of the General Belgrano occurred outside the TEZ, which made it the
most contentious action of the entire Falklands War. The situation, the location of the
Belgrano before and after, and the change of the ROE added to the controversy and
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confusion. Even two days after the sinking the British government was still confused on
the Belgrano’s course stating that “no-one present could state whether the BELGRANO
had in fact entered the TEZ before the attack.”146 The British intelligence did not help the
government’s justification claims for sinking the ship either:
“Bearing in mind the earlier intelligence that the Belgrano was likely to
make a brief incursion into the Total Exclusion Zone, I asked whether we
had any intelligence to show whether such an incursion had already been
made when the Belgrano was torpedoed. I was told that there was no such
intelligence, and in reply to my further question was told that the Belgrano
had been travelling at 280 (i.e. virtually due west) when the engagement
took place.”147
However, the British did know that “at the time she was hit she was heading West at
280.”148 Therefore, it was no surprise that controversy continued to grow when the
location and travelling direction of the Belgrano were made public. The House of
Commons demanded answers. Member of Parliament (MP) Mr. Denis Healey suggested
that the sinking of the Belgrano might have “[weakened] or even [destroyed] the
possibility of negotiations for a long-term solution.”149 MP Dr. John Gilbert was more
critical of the government and questioned the motives behind the attack: “was it not
aimed at using the minimum force to achieve the maximum military advantage, but that,
on the contrary, it was aimed at producing the maximum casualties and psychological
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shock to the Argentines?”150 MP William Hamilton was worried about who was making
the important decisions: “in other words, it was made by either the Prime Minister or
[John Nott], or both of them together? Or was it made by the admiral on the spot? It is
extremely important that the country should know who is making decisions to kill in the
South Atlantic.”151
However, the controversy did not erupt into major conspiracy theories until
December 1982. An Official Dispatch regarding the Falklands was released to the
London Gazette on 14 December and detailed the sinking of the Belgrano:
On 2 May, the Argentinian cruiser the GENERAL BELGRANO, with two
destroyers, was detected south of the Falklands by the H.M.S.
CONQUEROR. The enemy force was in a position where it posed a
serious threat to a number of our ships engaged in operations off the
Falklands while other Argentinian surface units were poised to the north.
It was a threat that could not be ignored and therefore H.M.S
CONQUEROR was ordered to attack the GENERAL BELGRANO with
torpedoes. Two struck the cruiser which sank some hours later. For over
two hours Argentinian destroyer carried out several unsuccessful depth
charge attacks against H.M.S CONQUEROR and then retired. Later they
returned to rescue survivors. Through the campaign, the cost in human
lives was my constant concern and in consequence, I [Commander-inChief Fleet Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse] ordered H.M.S. CONQUEROR
not to attack ships in rescue operations.152
Nevertheless, this was not a sufficient answer for many in the Opposition or public. On
21 December 1982 when MP Tam Dalyell alleged in Parliament that Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher “coldly and deliberately gave the orders to sink the Belgrano, in the
Secretary of State for Defense John Nott “rejected the charge utterly.” The Falklands
Campaign: a digest of debates in the House of Commons, 2 April to [15] June 1982. Her
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1982. 4 May 1982 Debate, 197
151
Ibid, 199
152
TNA: FCO 7/4379, Official Dispatch on the Falklands, final draft. Interesting amendments
made to a 6 September 1982 draft included the removal of the phrase “emphasis on naval
operations.”
150

57

knowledge that an honorable peace was on the offer and in the expectation --- all too
justified----that the Conqueror’s torpedoes would torpedo the peace negotiations.”153 In
1984, Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice fueled the debate even further with the
publication of The Sinking of the Belgrano.154 Mr. Dalyell and the authors argued that the
British government deliberately sabotaged the Peruvian peace initiative that Peruvian
President Fernando Belaúnde Terry had proposed on 2 May.155 According to the authors,
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her war cabinet knew of the peace proposal but
were “never really seriously interested in negotiating.” The authors contend that it is
“hard to avoid suspicions that the crews of both ships, the Conqueror as well as the
General Belgrano, were used in a cynical politico-military machination which most
Britons would want to see exposed.”156 Citing an interview with Captain Hector Bonzo,
the authors also insisted the Belgrano was not part of a pincer movement as that was just
“another speculation by the British government.”157 The sinking of the Belgrano spiraled
into an angry debate: a war crime or a justified act of war?
The debate over the sinking continued to grow and change in the decades after the
war. However, new evidence and interpretations have come to light. Commissioned by
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British government, two volumes of The Official History of the Falklands Campaign
composed by Sir Lawrence Freedman were published in 2005. Freedman determined the
controversy had grown because of confusion over time zones and when intelligence
reached London. He also cited discrepancies in reports, both official and unofficial, that
fueled the controversy. For example, there was confusion whether two or three torpedoes
were fired (it was three) and if the Conqueror detected the Belgrano on 1 May or 2 May
(it was 1 May). Interestingly, Freedman states: “there is no evidence that the cruiser’s
change of course was well known in MoD and Navy circles in May 1982.”158 However,
documents obtained for this thesis illustrate that on 4 May 1982 the Chiefs of Staff
Committee did know that “at the time she was hit she was heading West at 280°.”159
Freedman’s choice of “well known” is merely a disclaimer in that not everyone in the
MoD or navy knew of the course at the time of the attack. Indeed, an examination of the
Conqueror’s war diary confirmed that it had been expecting the Belgrano to turn into the
TEZ. Freedman criticized Gavshon and Rice’s work, citing their lack of evidence and
impossible assumptions about what the British could have known and the speed with
which the senior politicians might have known about the Peruvian peace initiative.160
Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins also brush aside the conspiracy theories regarding the
Peruvian peace initiative. They argue that it would be hard to believe that the Junta
might have been on the “brink of conceding a virtually identical peace formula to that so
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recently and comprehensively rejected from Haig.”161 After consulting his own Argentine
sources, both Freedman and the sources became convinced that Gavshon and Rice’s
conspiracy did not hold up. In particular, Freedman and his sources analyzed Argentine
signals that might have indicated British knowledge of the Argentine withdrawal as early
as 2007Z on 1 May.162 However, it was determined this was confusion caused by
Admiral Anaya who had actually initiated offensive operations.
Witness statements changed as well. Just before his death in 2009, Captain
Bonzo publicly stated that the sinking “was absolutely not a war crime. It was an act of
war, lamentably legal.”163 He also stated that “when they gave us the authorization to use
our weapons, if necessary, we knew we had to be prepared to attack, as well as be
attacked. Our people were completely trained. I would even say we were anxious to pull
the trigger.”164 According to Bonzo’s interview, “the Argentine navy had changed its
rules of engagement, and he was under orders to fire on any British warships that came
within range of his guns.”165 Other British sources cite Argentine Admiral Enrique
Molina Pico’s admission that the Belgrano was “heading away from the enemy fleet only
momentarily, as the commander saw fit to wait for a more convenient time (to attack).”
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by Prime Minister Thatcher to collect all data and intelligence regarding the sinking. He
concluded that “the destination of the vessel was not to her home port as the Argentine
Junta had stated but the objective of the ship was to relocate to a prearranged rendezvous
point (RZ) within the exclusion zone.” 167 His report also determined that:
Shortly after the UK’s announcement of an exclusion zone, the
Argentinian Navy HQ notified its warships, possibly for the purpose of regrouping, of a pre-arranged rendezvous point (RZ). When the coordinate
for this RV were plotted on a map, the actual location, though east of the
Falkland Islands, was nevertheless inside the 200 nautical miles exclusion
zone. Some considerable time prior to Conqueror firing its torpedoes, my
analysis revealed that the Belgrano had been instructed to alter course and
head in the direction of the RV inside the exclusion zone.168
However, Major Thorp’s work should be treated with caution. While he cites secret
papers, no record of this investigation, or request of an investigation, were found in the
Foreign and Commonwealth office documents released in 2012. As well, there is no
mention of any “rendezvous” point in Admiral Woodward’s biography, Freedman’s
official history, or any other major works referring to the Falklands War.
The controversy surrounding the sinking of the General Belgrano has died down
significantly. Recent admissions by former Argentine military and officials along with
analysis of both Argentine and British intelligence have rightly so silenced many
“Belgranauts.”169 However, the recently released government documents offer a new
interpretation about the sinking of the ARA General Belgrano. The main concern and
real target of the British Task Force was the Argentine aircraft carrier, the 25th of May.
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Before any landing operation commenced, the British needed to neutralize the Argentine
navy, and to achieve that, the target became the carrier. All legal and political
preparations were made and ready by 30 April for this sinking. However, the events that
occurred between 1 and 2 May called for changes in the plan. The British knew the
carrier group was to the north but they did not know where exactly. Nevertheless, they
did know exactly where the General Belgrano group was located. With intelligence and
Admiral Woodward’s training experience, the decision was made: the Belgrano, not the
carrier, was to be sunk. This was not a simple decision as the cruiser was located outside
the TEZ, and thus not covered by the ROE. However, government planning had allowed
for SSNs to engage outside the TEZ, under the discretion of the Task Force Commander.
The British government knew this would not be received well by the Opposition, the
Argentines, other countries and anti-war advocates but the decision to change the ROE
was carried out of necessity for the campaign. For the overall British success in the
Falklands War, the sinking of the Belgrano was crucial. Not only did the Argentine navy
remain close to the mainland for the duration of the war, but the British Task Force, and
more importantly, the carriers, were never seriously threatened during the war.
Unfortunately after the war, confusion over time zones and what was known when only
compounded the fury over the decision. The Belgranauts’ adverse reactions and anger
with the British government in the 1980’s were certainly justified at the basis of the
information available at that time. But with the recently released government documents,
their anger needs to be re-directed. Perhaps they can conjure conspiracies regarding the
government’s concern for and the plan to sink the Argentine carrier.
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CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND THE MEDIA: AN ANALYSIS OF BRITISH
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
I am told that nowadays in these great establishments you are all taught that you have to
love the press and co-operate with the press. I hope you are also taught, outside the
meetings that the press are nothing but a pain in the arse! Whatever the circumstances,
they will do their very utmost to make a military operation almost impossible. 170
-

Secretary of State for Defense John Nott

While caught off guard by the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the British
certainly, albeit unintentionally, contributed to the chaos and confusion months, and even
years, before the conflict. Despite repeated warnings from the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC) of a possible military threat, dating back to November 1978, the British
had sold more than £ 200 million worth of naval, aerial and electronic equipment,
missiles and other weapons to Argentina.171 In 1981, Secretary of State for Defense John
Nott’s Defense Review, in an effort to slash budgets and focus on NATO commitments,
proposed reductions for the British military, cuts which primarily affected the naval
forces. These cuts called for the Royal Navy to lose one fifth of its 60 Destroyers and
Frigates, the HMS Invincible to be sold to the Australians, the HMS Hermes to be
decommissioned, landing platform dock (LPD) class ships HMS Intrepid and Fearless to
be scrapped and the icebreaker HMS Endurance to be pulled from the South Atlantic.172
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While the Defense Review’s plan and all sales were immediately scrapped when the
Argentines invaded, the British military had already faced cancellations for technological
upgrades, and major reductions in logistical units and supplies in the years before. The
British had plenty of men but they desperately needed any support in these areas. To
further exacerbate the situation, the British government was not only worried about its
own military’s capability, but it was also concerned about other countries, such as Brazil
and Venezuela, that supported Argentine claims to the islands. There were worries that
they might back the Argentine cause with sizeable force and supplies.173 The
Government assessed Argentina’s neighbors, other Latin American countries, the
Americans, and the Soviets for military capabilities and potential assistance.
Throughout the Falklands War, the Americans sought to maintain a publicly
neutral stance due to their “reservations about the broad strategic consequences of the
campaign.” 174 These “reservations” were based on the fear that joint British-American
action could lead to Soviet involvement in the conflict and worse, involvement in the
Western hemisphere, America’s backyard.175 The Americans were trying to gather
support for their proposed South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO), including South
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Africa, Uruguay and Argentina. The aim was to block Soviet influence in the region.
With the Panama Canal and South Atlantic in their control, the Americans were seeking
more control of the linking points of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.176 Joint BritishAllied actions in the Falklands would jeopardize this mission and the American efforts
between June 1981 and February 1982 would have been in vain. 177
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) American Admiral Harry
Train offered another explanation for the American stance. He argued that since the
United States projected substantial power in the Organization of American States (OAS),
the credibility of the organization would be severely reduced if “potential aggressors
believed that the OAS had no effective arrangements for collective security.”178 Train
rationalized that because the OAS did not collectively support action on the behalf of
Argentina, the Americans could lose face with other OAS members if they involved
themselves on either side without authorization. Albeit overreaching in concern, he
worried that American action on British behalf could call into question the overall
strength of the alliance. Train wanted to avoid the question of: how could one state say
they support and belong to an organization and yet partake in unauthorized action that
said organization does not endorse? However, Admiral Train’s fears are exaggerated: the
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Americans were (and still are) the most influential member of the OAS. They certainly
did not fear any damaging repercussions from the organization.179
However, the Americans were actually more concerned with NATO
commitments. They were also extremely apprehensive about helping the British, let alone
being associated with their actions; they feared British association could jeopardize
American relations with regional allies as well as political, economic and influence
within Latin America and South America.180 Ultimately for the Americans, the cost of
publicly alienating Britain outweighed the cost of potentially damaging pro-American
sentiments within those countries.
However, despite uneasiness about assisting the British campaign, and even while
Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s negotiations were ongoing, the Americans were
covertly “prepared to offer increased assistance to the UK should the Haig negotiations
fail.”181 Accordingly, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher asked her aides to examine
whether American assistance would be accepted by the rest of Her Majesty’s
Government.182 While negotiations were ongoing, Thatcher instructed that a preliminary
study be made into the “areas in which the UK would benefit from increased U.S. support
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for OPERATION CORPORATE.”183 Assumptions were immediately made in regards to
the level of commitment the Americans were willing to give: the U.S. would not commit
forces to hostilities and base facilities in South America would not be available to the
U.S. for overt support of UK operations.184 Instead, the British government sought
logistical and technological military assistance from the Americans. At the top of the list
were intelligence capabilities including amplified satellite and meteorological coverage,
increased surveillance and information on the South Atlantic surface and sub-surface
plots, U2 planes and long range Maritime Radar Recon and Air-to-Air refueling
operations. The British also needed increased access and priority in U.S. Defense
Satellite Communications systems. For transporting any subsequent reinforcements to
and from Ascension Island, the British considered asking for American amphibious
shipping support. Finally, the British asked the Americans for logistics support, weapons,
equipment and material supplies.185 However, all of the requested items and materials
were not considered crucial to the success of OPERATION CORPORATE while
requirements “would need to be reviewed in the event of intensive hostilities.”186
The other Cold War superpower created a sticky situation for the British.
Intelligence reports indicated that a Soviet Krivak class destroyer and an Alligator
Landing Ship, Tank (LST) had left Luanda, Angola heading towards the Falklands as
early as 14 April. There were also worries about the capability of Soviet satellites to
183
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track the British fleet’s movements. To combat this, when satellites were known to be
overhead, the Task Force was forced to maintain electronic silence to avoid detection. A
major concern for the British was the amount of activity near or surrounding Ascension
Island. The island was located 4,200 miles from Britain and 3,800 miles from the
Falklands and served as the halfway point from the British Task Force. The one airfield
on the island was extremely critical for the mission; furthermore the island provided the
last stopping point before the Task Force set out for the Falklands. Any threat to the
island would serve as a threat to the entire campaign. Soviet BearD Aircraft were
carrying out reconnaissance sorties within 50 miles of the island and an AGI ship had
been shadowing the British troop transit ship SS Canberra since it left the Mediterranean
for Ascension Island. 187 On 29 April, a Soviet intelligence gathering vessel, the
Primorye, approached Ascension Island from the north.188 This was especially alarming
for the British. Although the Soviets never directly threatened Ascension Island, and
there was never indication that they were going to, the British knew they were gathering
intelligence. What remained to be seen was if the Soviets were providing the Argentines
with any of that intelligence.189 Throughout the campaign, the British fears of Soviets
supporting the Argentines never subsided.
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Of greater concern to the British was the potential for an accident or unintentional
escalation of war to include the Soviets. For example, the implementation of the
Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) and then the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ), immediately
raised alarms about potential Soviet involvement. Though the British nuclear powered
submarines (SSN) were able to make distinctions between nuclear and conventional
submarines, British surface ships lacked the capability to make a highly accurate
assessment of the type of detected submarine. The Argentine naval fleet had only
conventional submarines; however, any SSN operating on less than “its full capability”
could have been interpreted to be a conventional submarine.190 Consequently, there was
a risk of a Soviet SSN entering the zone and being mistaken for an Argentine
conventional submarine and attacked. British military and intelligence officials
determined that the “Ministers should be aware of this possibility.”191 While the British
sought logistical and technological support from the Americans, they feared any
unfortunate encounter with the Soviets or any accidental escalation of war with Argentine
allies.
Potential Argentine allies included Latin American and South American countries
that harbored sympathies for the Argentine invasion. The British government listed
Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, French Guiana, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, Uruguay and other
to be credible: Moscow would be well aware of the “dreadful international consequences of such
a move.” Freedman, Vol. II, 140
190
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Caribbean countries as potential Argentine allies. However, they were determined not to
be threats as they had “nothing significant to contribute” due to their lack of military
capabilities.192 Columbian intervention was ruled out because of “[wariness] of
Venezuela” and Ecuador was ruled out because of “[wariness] with Peru.”193 Brazil,
Cuba, Peru and Venezuela were determined to be possible candidates for intervention on
behalf of Argentina.194 However, these fears were quickly dismissed. Reports surfaced
that the Brazilian navy was out to sea, including a carrier, but it was assessed to part of a
naval exercise which had been planned for some months before and unrelated to the
crisis. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that 6 Peruvian FBA
Aircraft had been deployed with Argentine units. This report was discounted because the
“Rio Treaty had not been invoked and the Peruvian government had denied alerting her
force.”195 Otherwise known as the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the
Rio Treaty called for agreeing nations to support each other against military threat from
outside the continent. The Rio Treaty was never invoked during the Falklands War: two
thirds majority was needed for joint action against the British and although a member,
Argentina “traditionally stood aloof from the organization.”196 There was only one
instance that concerned the British in regards to Bolivians. A report surfaced that the
Bolivian Air Force had been put at the disposal of Argentina. Oddly, the British easily
192
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disregarded this report because it “did not reflect official Bolivian government policy.”197
There was no further mention of potential Bolivian involvement.
The British did consider bringing the fight to the Argentine mainland. The
military considered landing in Southern Argentina (Tierra del Fuego) at the end of May at
the earliest. Politically, this would have been a severe blow to the military Junta and
would have provided a “bargaining counter for withdrawal of Argentine forces from the
Falkland Islands.”198 The military was optimistic that it was able to “demonstrate the
capability to extend the conflict.”199 However, as a member of the United Nations and
the Security Council, the British needed to abide by the UN Charter. In particular, the
British government was especially concerned with Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations. It stated:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.200
Under the pretenses of self-defense of British territory, the British could have argued that
invading the Argentine mainland would have stopped supplies from reaching the
Argentine garrison and as well as preventing aerial raids and bombings of the Task Force.
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However, the Government concluded that it would face severe repercussions
internationally and domestically as the “legitimacy under Article 51 of [United Nations
Charter] would be challenged.”201 Since there was no declaration of war by either side,
the British determined that “self-defense” for the Falklands would not be a sufficient
excuse for invading mainland Argentina under the terms of Article 51. While the military
believed they could extend their current capabilities onto the mainland, the government
also determined that any mainland invasion would invalidate the TEZ, thus opening the
waters surrounding the Falklands. Ultimately, an Argentine mainland invasion would
“greatly reduce capacity for subsequent operations against Argentine Forces on the
Falkland Islands, which is the UK aim.”202
However, the British did conclude that the feasibility of landing in south
Argentina rested on the use of appropriate Chilean airfields or the full co-operation of the
Chilean air force. Such contingency plans included increased military co-operation
between the British and Chileans, involving the possibility for a formal military alliance.
Cooperation with Chile would divide Argentine forces and compel Argentina to meet
threats on two fronts. The British hoped by drawing Argentine forces away from the
Falkland Islands they could relieve pressure on air cover operations over the islands. Full
cooperation with Chileans would give the British access to Chilean bases which would
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“offset the Argentine geographical advantage.”203 However, while the military
advantages were tempting, the political disadvantages completely overrode these military
considerations. It was determined that politicians in both Chile and the United Kingdom
would never accept this and it would “remove possibility of all-party political support in
the UK.”204 Overall, Chilean-British cooperation would likely draw in Latin American
and possibly other nations “and engender strong adverse international reaction.”205 The
“feasibility” of Chilean-British military cooperation was determined to be “doubtful.”206
Despite the assistance, the Americans were adamant that the extent of their
involvement and assistance remain undisclosed. Since the U.S. Administration was
divided on supporting the British during the war, “sensitivities” remained within the
American government even months after the war.207 To combat rumors and speculation
in the media, the British decided to acknowledge what was being reported yet deny any
further information: “The fact that we had the STINGER air defense weapon (and that it
scored one kill) is already acknowledged by us, but not when or how it was acquired. We
are currently using AM2 matting at Port Stanley airfield, but neither this nor the supply of
other U.S. material should be specifically acknowledged.”208 When “pressed on details on
U.S. supply of equipment and the assistance provided by the U.S. to the UK during the
conflict,” the government chose “[not to go] into details about the scale and nature of the
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assistance provided during the campaign.”209 The British determined that any matter of
that sort, including to what extent the Americans assisted, would be left for the U.S.
Government to comment on.210 Instead, the standard British government response was to
be: “the assistance provided by the U.S. to the UK during the conflict was based on the
wide-ranging pattern of peacetime defense collaboration between our two
countries….For our part, we have expressed our thanks to the U.S. for the support they
provided.”211
The degree of acknowledgement of American assistance exemplified the dilemma
the British government faced with the media. The British faced a double edged sword:
the media, including British, American, Argentine and other foreign sources, needed to
be kept at arm’s length but not too far away. Friction between the media and authorities
immediately began when many British media members wanted to report the war as
“dispassionately as possible.”212 Citing fears of media relations similar to those the
Americans faced during the Vietnam War, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) initially
resisted allowing journalists and news correspondents to sail down with the Task Force.
However editors who “had the ear” of the Prime Minister persuaded her to allow their
correspondents to travel with the Task Force. 213 In Vietnam, correspondents and
journalists had been granted extraordinary freedoms to go anywhere, see everything and
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write relatively censor-free. 214 In general, the American media in Vietnam showed
restraint in reporting and publishing sensitive details and was much more likely to
cooperate with military officials. In complete contrast, the British government feared the
lack of control by the British media to self-censor or honor agreements with military
officials. To minimize the publishing of sensitive information, this became one aspect of
the war the MoD fully controlled: only British correspondents were allowed to
accompany the Task Force and to do so, they had to sign forms agreeing to censorship.
Foreign journalists were forced to pursue other alternatives. ABC television even
considered chartering a tramp steamer, offering space to other American televisions
networks and newspapers. However, since the British threat to sink any ship in the TEZ
did not make exemptions for American press boats, the tramp steamer never set sail.215
For the journalists who remained in London, anger grew when all background
briefings were stopped when the Task Force set sail. They were later resumed under
pressure from the Downing Street press officer, Bernard Ingham, who ill concealed his
contempt for the [Ministry of Defense’s] information performance.216 Friction was also
created between the British government and Reuters, the international news agency,
when the latter refused to be bound by D-Notices. 217 Short for Defense Notice, DNotices were official requests from the British government to news editors not to publish
214
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news items on specified subjects for reasons of national security. When the British
government sent a D-notice to Reuters not to report the location of the British fleet in
relation to Ascension Island, the editor was not concerned for the security of “our forces,”
since Reuters was not a British news agency.218 British news agencies also resisted the Dnotices. Peter Hennessy, writing for both The Times and Economist in 1982, argued with
officials over the MoD’s heavy-handed re-vetting of already vetted copy from the Task
Force.219 Throughout the entire campaign, there was a constant tug of war between the
British government and the media: when the MoD complained of speculation about
operational plans and reporting of assistance from third countries, arguing that such
reporting jeopardized any help, editors countered with complaints of “paucity of
information,” delay in announcing operations which were already over, and the MoD’s
inability to confirm or deny information obtained from other sources.220 At a typical MoD
press conference, a spokesman would have issued a statement as follows: “We have no
reports of any major Argentine warships or auxiliaries having penetrated the maritime
exclusion zone.”221 After a few seconds, the press corps “would be on its feet trying to
pin him down,”: “what do you mean by ‘reports?”, “why ‘major ships’?”, “Did
‘penetrate’ mean from the mainland to the islands or from the islands to the mainland as
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well?”222 The debate between the MoD and the media boiled down to the conflict
between the protection of servicemen’s lives and the “public’s right to know.” 223 To
exemplify this, the MoD lied when denying reports that HMS Invincible had suffered a
breakdown in one of the engines soon after it departed from Portsmouth.224Since the
carrier was vital to the entire campaign, the MoD wished to keep the information
confidential, not just from the press but more importantly, from the Argentines.
Friction between military personnel and journalists sailing with the Task Force
continued to grow after the Task Force departed from Ascension Island. Satellite
communications on HMS Hermes were limited, restrictions set in place to limit the
number of journalists allowed on ship, and military unhappiness over breaches of
security, including reports of departures of ships from Ascension Island, continued to add
fuel to the fire. A particular battle between the BBC and Task Force Commander Rear
Admiral John “Sandy” Woodward emerged while the Task Force was en route to the
Falklands. Brian Hanrahan of the BBC alleged that Admiral Woodward told reporters
that “it was his intention to cause as much confusion to the enemy as possible, and if
there was any way he could use us as part of the attempt, he intended to do so.”225 An
extremely vocal and opinionated officer, Admiral Woodward gave an interview regarding
the South Georgia Island recapture in which he was quoted as saying “South Georgia was
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the appetizer, now this is the heavy punch coming up behind. My Battle Group is
properly formed and ready to strike. This is the big-run up to the Big Match which my
view should be a walkover. I’d give odds of 20 to 1 on, to win.”226 The headline for the
article, “WALKOVER WOODWARD”,” produced a strong reprimand from both the
British government and higher military officials but it also prompted Woodward to hold
back information from the media: “Personally, I found myself tempted to use this modern
communication tool which might just have had enough effect on world opinion to cause
the Argentines to think again; hence my much published interview after South Georgia
while my personal views were much less sanguine.” 227 While safety measures were taken
to prevent security breaches, the Task Force quickly learned that the “information to the
Press cannot be confined to formal briefings and while dispatches to newsdesks can be
vetted, it is infinitely more difficult to censor the telephone conversations conducted over
modern satellite systems.”228 New technologies presented new challenges for control of
the press. From sailing to Ascension Island to the conclusion of the campaign, the
relationship between the war correspondents and military officials remained acrimonious.
The British and American media were keen on creating headlines and selling
newspapers. As they turned to consulting retired admirals and generals for ‘expert’
commentary, there was constant speculation about British movements and intentions. In
226
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many cases, what the BBC and other media outlets were reporting was accurate. For
example, the British air support difficulties and disadvantages were listed just as the Task
Force arrived within the TEZ: “The 10 Harrier jump jets with the lead ships in the fleet
may soon be reinforced by another 10, an authoritative source said.”229 Just before the
mainland invasion of the Falklands, The New York Times accurately reported that “Rear
Admiral John F. Woodward, the task force commander, was gathering his vessels into
one group, with the amphibious assault ships Fearless and Intrepid and smaller logistical
landing craft positioned for an attack on the Falklands.”230 There were of course
inaccurate reports as well. For example, the media often and incorrectly announced
Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) patrols had landed on the
islands231. These claims were based on “unreliable American ‘sources’.”232 However,
while the British officials were not keen on the media speculating and reporting accurate
and detailed information, many of these reports actually harmed the Argentines. The
inaccurate SAS and SBS reports kept Argentine forces on high alert, only to fatigue them
for the actual invasion. Reports of Task Force movement and capabilities certainly hurt
Argentine morale as many Argentines soldiers were conscripted as well as ill-equipped
and ill-prepared for combat. Knowing a powerful military was on its way to recapture its
territory would have undoubtedly scared these soldiers.
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There were instances, however, when the media’s drive to be the first to report
also immensely helped the Argentines, who would come to rely on the media, most often
the BBC, for a majority of their intelligence about British activities. During the mainland
invasion of East Falkland, several bombs dropped on British ships did not detonate, thus
saving countless lives. Partially this was because they were being dropped at too low an
altitude, but the primary reason was because the fuses were set incorrectly. Luckily, the
Americans, who had supplied the Argentines with bomb fuses before the invasion, were
aware that the fuses were not being set correctly. They never got in touch with the
Argentineans to alert them to the incorrect fusing. 233 However, after being briefed by the
MoD, the BBC reported the failure of the bombs to detonate and thus alerted the
Argentines to the issue. The MoD’s worst fears materialized as these reports were
published “without thought for the operational risks.”234 The Ministry complained that
not only did the BBC broadcast the information in London, “for the ears of any
Argentinian diplomat or military attaché, they actually put it out on the World Service for
the entire South Atlantic to hear.”235 As British troops were advancing in the San Carlos
Water area after the landing on 21 May, the BBC again prematurely announced that “the
Paras are moving towards Darwin.” With the element of surprise gone, not surprisingly,
the Paras met strong Argentine resistance in Darwin. Paras” is short for Parachute
Regiment, the Airborne Infantry of the British Army similar to the 82nd and 101st
Airborne of the US Army. After the BBC announced the movement, Argentine forces
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were reinforced in the area. Admiral Woodward doubted that the Para Regiment would
ever be able to entirely forgive the BBC for this. 236
The British also had to counter Argentinian information that was being picked up
by the BBC. Although much of the information the Argentinians were reporting was
incorrect, there were instances when Argentine reports were correct and even
contradicted British reports. An example of this was especially evident with the British
bombing of Port Stanley airfield on 1 May. The Argentines reported that the bombings
had had no significant effect on the runway and therefore, they were still able to resupply
the garrison. This was indeed true; the runway was never properly put out of commission
throughout the entire war. The British did know that the 1 May raid did not put the
runway out of commission but were eager to save public face because they had boasted
of the success of the run. They insisted the runway was out of commission and
“confidently discounted [the Argentine report regarding the runway] throughout the
campaign as just more of many wild boasts coming from Buenos Aires.”237 Since the
Argentines were notorious for reporting multiple “sinkings” of ships, (and these ships
were never actually sunk, nor properly attacked), the British counters to “wild boasts”
from Argentina were believable. For example, on 30 May, the Argentinians reported
they had attacked and sunk the HMS Invincible with an Exocet missile. The Argentine
pilots claimed to have seen the ship hit as smoke was billowing from below. Argentine
newspapers even published photos of the Invincible burning. In reality, the Exocet missile
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missed two frigates, the HMS Exter and Avenger. The smoke the pilots reported was
actually from the Avenger’s 4.5 inch anti-aircraft gun while the Invincible was twenty
miles away. Admiral Woodward called this Argentine report “the least accurate story of
the whole war.”238
Even then, and because the Argentines had come to rely on British sources for
intelligence, there were instances when the British government was able to prevent the
Argentines from gaining valuable intelligence. Nevertheless, the British faced a doubleedged sword with this ability: attention had to be paid both to the sensitivities of next of
kin and the intelligence value of disclosure to Argentina.239 On 25 May, the Type 42
destroyer HMS Coventry was sunk and the Atlantic Conveyor, a transport ship, was
severely damaged by the Argentines and eventually sunk. The Argentines had wasted
two of their five Exocet missiles on the Atlantic Conveyor as they believed her to be a
frigate or destroyer. The Argentine navy pilots had to wait for the BBC bulletin to learn
what they hit. The news was released at 10:20pm London time, 7:20pm Falklands and
Argentina time:
During the last hours we have heard of further attacks on our ships. One of
our ships of the Task Force has been badly damaged and early reports are
that she is in difficulty. Rescue operations are in progress. I have no
further details at present.240
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In fact, the report was only referring to the loss of Coventry. The vagueness of the report
led the Argentine air force to believe they had hit a major ship, perhaps even one of the
carriers.241 Knowing the Argentines would likely be listening to the BBC, the British
kept their report deliberately vague as they did not want to fully disclose what had been
hit and sunk. However, when news of the hit on the Atlantic Conveyor emerged, the
anxieties of family and next of kin from both ships prompted the British government to
clarify the very next morning at 11:45AM:
HMS Coventry, a destroyer, was hit and has been lost. The Atlantic
Conveyor, a merchant ship requisitioned to support the fleet, was also hit
and has had to be abandoned. The Harrier reinforcements she was
carrying for the Task Force had already been disembarked. Rescue
operations to recover the crews of these two shops have continued
throughout the night.242
When British reporters who entered Port Stanley after the Argentine surrender on
14 June learned that the Argentine Hercules transports were still using the runway up to
the last day of the war, British reporters were none too enthused with this discovery. 243
For the British government, this did not matter and there were no attempts to apologize.
If the raid on the Port Stanley runway had been reported as unsuccessful, combined with
the controversial sinking of the General Belgrano the very next day on 2 May, the British
government would have faced severe backlash from anti-war proponents and the
Opposition, who most likely would have accused the British government of unnecessarily
escalating the conflict. In this instance, the British government chose to lie to save face;
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the real objective of fabrication was to ensure that the overall mission continued. At the
time, the lie calmed the “pain in the arse” journalists.
As it became evident the British were going to take Port Stanley, the government
decided that the “the best publicity for the UK would be obtained by allowing journalists
early access, while evidence of the Argentine occupation and fighting was still available
and while the Task Force’s morale was still at its peak.”244 The British government was
also especially concerned with Latin American and American media interpretations and
reports following the conclusion of the war. Subsequently, the British government
deemed that “it was important that Latin American journalists, who seldom did so, should
visit the Falkland Islands and obtain the views of the Islanders at first hand. 245 The hope
was that these Latin American journalists would not only portray the British in a positive
light but also counter Argentine media and propaganda. The British especially wanted
these journalists to see and report that the Falkland Islanders were ecstatic to see the
British soldiers and the return to British rule. Typically very anti-Argentine, some
Chilean journalists were “robustly pro-British in tone, at times so embarrassingly so as to
run the risk of being counter-productive.”246 The British were relying on the Latin
American perspective so much that when an exiled Chilean journalist “[lost] no
opportunity to portray the British in a bad light”, and wrote a “jaundiced” piece on the
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British campaign, there were immediate attempts to discredit him.247 The journalist in
question, Raul Sohr Jr., was very anti-British and very anti-colonial. Headlines for his
work included “The Argentine soldiers fought for the Malvinas; the British soldiers
fought to win this war,” while he claimed that:
The MoD official (who told me with more than a hint of satisfaction that I
would need a passport because I would not be leaving British
territory)…knew that I was going to be the first Latin Americans to visit
the Malvinas since the British recapture. I could have reminded him that
the Malvinanses need special permission to enter Great Britain. But no. I
was not interested in restarting the polemic, only in beginning a journey to
witness for myself what had happened in the Malvinas.
A crew member told me it cost the British government $1,250,000 to bring
us to the Falklands by DC10 and Hercules…I remembered that the total
British aid to the Islands between 1976 and 1980 had been $12 million.
Mr. Hunt [Governor of the Falklands] liked the idea of converting the
archipelago into a multinational base led by the United States. But he did
not wish to enter into details.248
He also argued that:
The ex-Governor, currently Civil Commissioner of the Falklands
confesses, with certain candor, what London tries to deny: that the
Malvinas are subjected to a colonial regime. The attitude of the British
Government is explicable by their fear of stepping on to a slippery slope;
if they admit that this is a colony they will lend credence to the Argentine
thesis that the 1,800 inhabitants do not constitute a people but a form part
of a colonial apparatus.249
The British wanted to maintain good public relations with Latin American countries and
it did not help that Sr. Sohr was the first Latin American journalist to visit the islands
after the war. He was well known in Latin America, and his work was published in
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Chile’s widest read paper La Tercera and in many other Latin American papers. Despite
all of the hullabaloo about his articles, however, the efforts to discredit him were weak.
The British tried to discredit his work by highlighting his exile from Chile and living and
working situation in Mexico. The British asserted that Sr. Sohr, like other Latin American
critics, was “politically motivated” and that his “anti-colonialist” stance was dictated by
Moscow’s allies.250 The British also cited his influence from Chilean and Mexican
socialist parties as reasons for his stance. No other Latin American journalist was given
as much attention in the British government as Sr. Sohr was. It appears he struck a major
nerve.
At the start of the campaign, the former head of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield
Turner, suggested on television that the British could face defeat. 251 It was no secret for
the British that many high ranking American military officials viewed this war as
peripheral and irrelevant in the Cold War. While the Americans did not want to see action
and Soviet influence spread into their backyard, there was still an American sense of
arrogance towards the conflict. In September 1982, Admiral Harry Train, then Supreme
Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) privately told Admiral Woodward, “well there
are no lessons to be learnt from your little war. Well no new ones anyway.”252 Publicly,
Admiral Train rebuffed the suggestions that the Falklands War demonstrated that surface
250
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ships were still unacceptably vulnerable. Instead, he stated that if the British had had
“proper carriers” from which Airborne Early Warning aircraft (AEW) could operate,
ships like the HMS Sheffield would not have been lost.253 Moreover, he insisted that the
large carriers, not missing the chance to emphasis the battleships being reactivated by the
US Navy, were “designed and armored to enable them to remain operational despite
receiving hits off the front [of the ship] which had sunk British destroyers and frigates in
the South Atlantic.”254 Publicly and privately, the Americans were not enthusiastic about
the British campaign as they feared too much praise would trigger negative reactions in
Latin and South America. The Americans really did not think the Falklands War was that
big a deal.
In December 1982, the government acknowledged the tensions between the media
and government, which were fueled by “the absence on some occasions of sufficiently
detailed and up to date situation reports from the task force.”255 Limitations imposed on
communication systems, such as radio and electronic surveillance, caused tension
between military and press personnel. However, they did blame press speculation and
false Argentine propaganda as reasons why the British had to release information about
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the operation before family notifications were completed. 256 The debate between the
media and government was never settled during the Falklands War. The British feared
press speculation or leaks regarding foreign assistance as they could jeopardize those
options. They were especially concerned with the Americans backing out, taking with
them needed intelligence and logistical capabilities. Contingency plans for a BritishChilean coalition were not implemented; however they were also never fully dismissed.
The British were again fearful of the speculating press blowing the cover on any potential
covert operations or worse, isolating Chile from other Latin and South American
countries. It was not just the British press that was speculating on future British combat
action. It was also the Americans, Argentines, Germans and other Europeans who were
all looking to sell newspapers. Learning from the American military-media debacle in
Vietnam and with increasing technological capabilities for reporters to send news back
home, from a military perspective, the British were more than justified in isolating the
journalists travelling with the Task Force and limiting the details and briefings for the
journalists in London. Although the Argentines were able to catch the British off-guard
with the invasion, the British certainly did not want to lose any chances for foreign
cooperation or opportunities to gain the upper hand over the Argentine military. While
the press continued to speculate and sometimes report sensitive information, the British
government was able to either counter or use the media to their advantage when need be.
Even though the press thought they were being oppressed and censored, the British

256

The Falkland Campaign: The Lessons. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for
Defence by Command of Her Majesty, December 1982, London Her Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Point 257, 29

88

government was able to secure sensitive intelligence, minimize the number of lives lost
and recapture the Falkland Islands.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Since then, Britain, the colonial power, has refused to return the territories to the
Argentine Republic, thus preventing it from restoring its territorial integrity.257
-

Argentina President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

Britain will always be ready to defend the Falkland Islands.258
-

UK Prime Minister David Cameron

The Falklands War of 1982 did not alter the Cold War environment. In fact, it is often
referred to as a “little war.” However, Admiral Sandy Woodward reminds us that “[the]
only thing ‘little’ about our war was the total number of British servicemen directly
involved, some twenty-five thousand, and of course, the time span of the fighting, only
six weeks. But those had days, and occasionally hours, which seemed like eternity itself
to those who fought there.”259 This war was neither irrelevant nor insignificant in the
grand scheme of world affairs. It will also not be last time conflict arises over the
Falkland Islands, largely thanks to the recent discovery of oil beds in the South Atlantic.
In March 2013, the Falklands held a referendum in which 98.8% of the 92% turnout
voted to remain British.260 As expected, the Argentines decried this referendum,
attributing it to British propaganda. No one could have predicted Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher’s determination to recover the islands. The question remains: has she
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set a precedent for future British governments to respond with military force? Will the
British always defend the Falklands? The British went to great lengths to protect their
colony in 1982, sending a Task Force over 8,000 miles away to the South Atlantic. Will
they do it again?
The documents challenge popular assumptions and interpretations about the war. The
first interpretation is that British media stoked patriotism back home; while this is correct,
the documents and other sources demonstrate the lengths the British government had to
go to control the ever eager media. No doubt frustrated by the lack of information and
length of travel, British journalists sometimes jeopardized the lives of servicemen in their
attempts to sell newspapers. A second assumption is that the British and Argentines were
alone in this war. Again, the documents reveal that British were covertly aided by the
Americans, they considered asking Chile to join in operations and that they knew the
Soviets were patrolling the South Atlantic. Lastly, controversy remains whether the
sinking of the ARA General Belgrano was justified or a war crime. The British
justifiable feared the Argentine navy. Serious consideration was given to sinking the
Argentine carrier, 25th of May, as she could seriously crippled or even halt the British
campaign to recover the islands. Along with the documents, recent admissions by the
Belgrano’s captain, analysis of the events on 2 May 1982 and breaking down the factors
which stoked controversy only uphold the British decision to sink the Belgrano. It is
time for those conspiracy theories to finally disappear.

91

APPENDICES

92

Appendix A
Draft Statement Following Crippling or Sinking of Argentine Aircraft Carrier, 30 April
1982

1. The United Kingdom is entitled, in the exercise of its inherent right of selfdefense as recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to take
appropriate measures to protect its forces as well as its territory.
2. The Argentine carrier, the 25th May, when at large in the South Atlantic and
operating within imminent striking range of our naval units, was a dangerous
threat to those units—not only those in the TEZ itself but also to those in our vital
sea lines of communication on which the Task Force is dependent.
3. On 23 April we gave a warning to the Argentine Government that any approach
by Argentine warships or military aircraft which could amount to a threat to
interfere with the mission of British forces in the South Atlantic would encounter
the appropriate response. Subsequently, on 28 April, the Government declared a
Total Exclusion Zone in the area of 200 nautical miles around the Falkland
Islands.
4. The Argentine Government chose to ignore these warnings. On 29 April the
Argentine Military Junta issued a communique declaring that it would treat as
hostile all British shipping within 200 miles of the Argentine coast and within a
200 miles radius of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich
Islands. Moreover, Argentine naval vessels, including the carrier, have been
maneuvering at sea for several days.
5. The range of carrier-borne aircraft and their ability to launch stand-off weapons
meant that the capacity of this carrier to make an effective strike against our units
operated over a distance many times greater than in the case of an ordinary vessel.
In addition, the speed and mobility of the carrier itself meant that it could, if it
escaped surveillance even for a short period, bring itself within much closer
launch range of our units without their having any effective warning. In these
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circumstances, the operation of the carrier at large in the area in which it was
encountered in itself constituted a threat to our vessels of the kind against which
they were warned in our notification of 23 April.
6. In the face of this threat, and of Argentina’s declared intention to submit British
forces to attack, the Government’s duty was clear as it was right to act as it did.
We are entitled and obliged to protect the lives and safety of our officers and men
on the Task Force, which is there in defense of our rights and our people in the
Falkland Islands. We are not prepared to tolerate hostile actions by the Argentine
forces directed against our legitimate response to attempts by the Junta to
perpetuate its armed aggression against the Falkland Islands while it continues the
build-up of its forces there in flagrant defiance of Security Council Resolution
502.
7. The Junta should be in no doubt that we do not, and will not, shirk our
responsibilities. 261
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Appendix B
Notification to the Argentine Government, 1 May 1982

In announcing a Total Exclusion one around the Falklands on 28April, HMG
made it clear that these measures are without prejudice to the right of the UK to take
whatever additional measures may be needed in exercise of its right of self-defense,
under Article 51 of the UN Charter. In light of the Argentine statement of 30 April of an
intention to consider hostile British vessels within 200 miles of the Argentine mainland,
the Falklands and their dependencies, the British government has decided on the
following measures. The Argentine carrier quote THE 25TH OF MAY unquote is hereby
warned not to move East of a line 45° West or South of a line 38° South. If the quote
25TH OF MAY unquote moves beyond this area she will be regarded as constituting an
immediate threat to British forces in the South Atlantic and will be liable to be dealt with
accordingly. Further, if any attack anywhere in the South Atlantic is made upon British
naval or air forces by an Argentine unit, all other Argentine naval units, including the
carrier quote THE 25TH OF MAY unquote, even if she is still within the area defined in
this communication, and all Argentine military operation at sea in the South Atlantic or in
air space over the South Atlantic will be regarded as hostile and are liable to be dealt with
accordingly.262

262

TNA: FCO 7/4610: UK Task Force, Attack on Argentine Aircraft Carrier, To Prime Minister
from Secretary of State, 1 May 1982
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